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State Inmunity and Human
Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts
and Minds
Roger O'Keefe*

ABSTRACT

This Article suggests that arguments against the
availability of state immunity as a bar to civil actions alleging
internationally wrongful ill-treatment abroad are not only
destined to fall by and large on deaf ears but are also
misdirected as a matter both of fairness and of the ultimate
policy objectives of human rights advocates. It would make more
sense for victims' interest groups to target the failure of allegedly
responsible states to afford victims the opportunity of a remedy
and the failure of victims' states of nationality to do enough to
defend their nationals'interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is not unusual these days for natural persons alleging illtreatment abroad at the hands of a foreign state in violation of some
rule of international law pertaining to the humane treatment of
individuals to attempt to sue that state for damages in the courts of
another state. It may be that the chosen forum state is the
complaining party's state of nationality or residence, or it may simply
be that the forum state's law, courts, and perhaps even legal
profession are more conducive to civil actions of this sort. Like many
trends, this one started in the United States, in this instance in the
wake of the rediscovery of the Alien Tort Claims Act in 1980,1 and
spread from there to Australasia, Canada, Europe, and from the last
to the European Court of Human Rights.2 In nearly all such actions
brought against the allegedly responsible foreign state as such or
against its government or some organ thereof or-leaving aside the
eccentric approach taken in at least one federal circuit in the United
States 3-against its serving or former officials for acts performed in

1.
See Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
2.
See cases cited infra notes 20-71.
3.
It has long been held in the Ninth Circuit-albeit under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2006) as would not be the
case after the Supreme Court's decision in Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(2010)-that while the individual officials, serving and former, of a foreign state are
prima facie entitled to state immunity in U.S. courts for acts performed in their official
capacity, this does not serve to shield them from suit in respect of acts performed
beyond the scope of their authority. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990). For a successful application of this dictum to circumvent
state immunity, see for example, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992).
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their official capacity, the claim has been defeated by the defendant's
procedural plea of state immunity, an immunity from the jurisdiction
of its courts which the forum state is generally obliged as a matter of
international law to accord foreign states in respect of acts of an
inherently sovereign nature. 4 Judgments to this effect have come
under criticism from victims' advocates and campaigners, 5 as well as
from a range of academic commentators; 6 and as one jurisdiction
rebuffs such claims others are seized of them. The assumption on the
part of opponents of state immunity in cases of this sort would appear
to be that final victory, as a matter of both international and domestic
law, is just a question of time.
This Article argues that any such assumption would be a
mistake. The indications are instead to the contrary. There is little
reason to think that many domestic courts or any international court
will eventually sidestep state immunity as it pertains to civil actions
alleging internationally wrongful ill-treatment inflicted abroad.
Equally, the chance that many national governments will legislate or
conclude a treaty to similar effect is slim. While those who contest the
availability of state immunity in such cases seem ever intent on

The principle enunciated in Chuidian was adopted by a district court in the First
Circuit in Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995), and by a district court
in the Second Circuit in Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1197-98
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). The approach accords with neither international law nor the decisions
of courts in other countries.
4.
See infra Part III.
5.
See, e.g., Press Release, Redress, Amnesty Int'l, & Justice, UK: Saudi
Torture Ruling Is a Sad Day for British Justice (June 14, 2006), available at
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news-details.asp?NewsID=16992.
6.
See, e.g., Kerstin Bartsch & Bjorn Elberling, Jus Cogens vs. State
Immunity, Round Two: The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the
Kalogeropoulou et al. v. Greece and Germany Decision, 4 GERMAN L.J. 477, 483-90
(2003); Andrea Bianchi, L'immunitd des Etats et les violations graves des droits de
1'homme: la fonction de l'interprite dans la determination du droit international, 108
REVUE GPNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 63 (2004) [hereinafter Bianchi,
L'immunitj des Etats]; Andrea Bianchi, Overcoming the Hurdle of State Immunity in
the Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 405 (Benedetto Conforti &
Francesco Francioni eds., 1997) [hereinafter Bianchi, Overcoming State Immunity];
Rory Stephen Brown, Access to Justice for Victims of Torture, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS
A HUMAN RIGHT 205 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007); Stacy Humes-Schulz, Limiting
Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Human Rights, 21 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 105 (2008);
Lorna McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting
Sovereignty, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 903 (2007); Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity
and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It Wrong, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 955
(2008); Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity in National and InternationalLaw:
Three Recent Cases Before the European Court of Human Rights, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
703 (2002); Isabelle Pingel, Droit d'accas aux tribunaux et exception d'immunitd: la
Cour de Strasbourgpersiste 106 REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
893, 906 (2002); Elina Steinerte & Rebecca M. M. Wallace, Jones v. Ministry of Interior
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2006).
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trying again, for the most part all they should realistically expect, in
the words of Samuel Beckett, is to fail better. Moreover, even in the
event of some, small success when it comes to overcoming immunity
from proceedings, there remain other obstacles-in particular,
immunity from measures of enforcement-which are likely, for the
most part, to prove intractable.
Nor, the Article submits, need this be seen as a bad thing, at
least in the abstract. (In any concrete, humanly deserving case, it can
only be a tragedy.) To decry a domestic court's grant of state
immunity to a foreign state defendant to such a claim or to berate a
state's government for declining to abrogate such immunity by way of
statute is to finger the wrong culprit--or, where the latter is also the
victim's state of nationality, to finger the right culprit for the wrong
thing. The rightful objects of opprobrium, and consequently those
against which public campaigns for redress stand to have greater
rhetorical purchase, are the foreign state that denies local or
international remedies and the government of the state of nationality
which makes no genuine effort to intercede with the allegedly
responsible state on behalf of the victim. In addition, a focus on these
actors in respect of these specific acts stands a better chance of
attaining what ought to be the ultimate policy objective of victims'
interest groups, namely universal subscription to the rule of
international law.
What follows does not presume to provide a detailed alternative
strategy for advocates of redress for death or personal injury caused
by foreign states in alleged violation of rules of international law
pertaining to the humane treatment of individuals-alternative, that
is, to the current and mostly futile and misdirected attack on the
availability or otherwise to those states of state immunity as a
procedural bar to civil actions in the courts of other states. Indeed,
the question need not be binary in the first place. Campaigners for
redress may wish to continue to target state immunity in the hope of
a breakthrough, albeit in the realistic expectation that none is very
likely to be forthcoming, even as they recalibrate their efforts to place
greater stress on other, rhetorically more attractive and maybe more
promising arguments. This is, needless to say, a matter for them. The
analysis in Part IV below seeks merely to sketch the outlines of a few
possible courses of action, looking first at measures targeting the
victim's state of nationality, which may or may not be the potential
forum state in any related "human rights" case, and then at moves
directed towards the allegedly responsible state. Some of these
measures are admittedly of a generic and prospective bent. As a
result, they may be of little practical help in relation to some
individual cases of alleged past violations, even if others stand to be
of more general benefit. Many of the suggestions involve no more
than a continuation and renewal of emphasis on precisely the sorts of
activities to which the organizational advocates of the denial of state
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immunity in "human rights" cases already lend their support. To
this extent, Part IV is acknowledged as both an exercise in preaching
to the converted and a recommendation to others of existing best
practice. It should also be conceded at the outset that none of these
suggestions necessarily have a significantly greater chance of success
than any legal challenge to the availability of state immunity in
"human rights" cases. Even if some small but practically valuable
progress is more likely than not to result, this simply remains to be
seen. By the same token, however, none of the strategies proposed
could fare appreciably worse than the focus on state immunity.
Moreover, and just as importantly, even in the event of failure, the
blame would lie where it should, namely with the victim's state of
nationality and with the allegedly responsible state. Finally, even if
the suggested measures should fail in the short term, the fact that
most of them seek to respond with more than (completely
understandable) expediency to the challenge of securing redress for
victims of internationally unlawful ill-treatment at the hands of
foreign states provides at least some small hope that each might
contribute, even in failure, to the eventual, lasting resolution of the
problem of civil impunity for international wrongs.

II. PREFATORY CLARIFICATIONS
The term "human rights" is used in two different senses. It is
often employed loosely to denote a generic concern, reflected in
various branches of international law, for the humane treatment of
individuals and certain groups. In this first sense, the label
encompasses not only international human rights law properly so
called but also international humanitarian law, prohibitions like
those on the commission by a state of genocide, and sometimes even
international criminal law.8 In its second, alternative sense, the term

7.

Taking the Redress Trust (better known simply as "Redress") as an

example, see REDRESS, IMMUNITY V. ACCOUNTABILITY: CONSIDERING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN STATE IMMUNITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TORTURE AND OTHER SERIOUS
IMMUNITY V.
REDRESS,
(2005) [hereinafter
57-58
CRIMES
INTERNATIONAL

ACCOUNTABILITY] (Recommendation 4: Redress advocates Parallel Developments in
Related Areas); REDRESS, THE PROTECTION OF BRITISH NATIONALS DETAINED ABROAD:
A DISCUSSION PAPER CONCERNING DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PROTECTION 23-25
(2005) [hereinafter REDRESS, PROTECTION OF BRITISH NATIONALS] (highlighting nine

questions to be addressed in relation to the United Kingdom's exercise of consular and
diplomatic protection in respect of UK nationals detained abroad).
See, e.g., Comm. on Int'l Human Rights Law and Practice, Final Report on
8.
the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Abuses, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-NINTH CONFERENCE HELD IN
LONDON 25-29TH JULY 2000 (2000), 403; STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2009); Andrea Bianchi,
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"human rights" is limited to international human rights guarantees
properly so called, viz those entitlements, opposable in principle to
states on the international plane, which public international law, be
it custom or treaty, vests in individuals and certain groups as an
avowed function of their humanity. Used this way, the label refers
strictly to the rights secured by universal instruments such as the
two international covenants on human rights,9 the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,' 0 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women," and so on; by regional instruments
such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),1 2 the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),13 the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,14 and the like; and by
customary international human rights law. While the second, legally
more accurate meaning of "human rights" is to be preferred,' 5 the
first must also be acknowledged and engaged with.
As for "state immunity," or foreign state immunity, by this is
meant the immunity from the jurisdiction of its courts, premised on
the sovereign equality of states, which a state is required by public
international law, whether custom or treaty, to accord in respect of
acts performed in the exercise of sovereign authority (that is, acts of
an inherently sovereign character) to other states, be it to those
states sued as such or to their governments and various organs of

Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 237 (1999);
Bianchi, Overcoming State Immunity, supra note 6, especially at 415-16; JUrgen
Br6hmer, Diplomatic Immunity, Head of State Immunity, State Immunity:
Misconceptions of a Notorious Human Rights Violator, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 361 (1999);
Jennifer A. Gergen, Note, Human Rights and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 36
VA. J. INT'L L. 765 (1996); Humes-Schulz, supra note 6; Christopher Keith Hall, UN
Convention on State Immunity: The Need for a Human Rights Protocol, 55 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 411 (2006); Pasquale de Sena & Francesca de Vittor, State Immunity and
Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case, 16 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 89 (2005).
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
9.
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
10.
See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
11.
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
12.
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
13.
123 [hereinafter ACHR].
See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520
14.
U.N.T.S. 217.
The author nonetheless confesses to at least one use of the first, albeit as a
15.
much younger man. See Roger O'Keefe, Civil Actions in US Courts in Respect of
Human Rights Abuses Committed Abroad: Would the World's Oppressors Be Wise to
Stay at Home? 9 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 15-41 (1997).
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government, to their serving and former officials in respect of acts
performed in their official capacity, and so on. 16 Another name for
such immunity is sovereign immunity or foreign sovereign immunity.
There are two ways in which human rights might in theory
influence the availability of state immunity to a foreign state,
whether sued qud that state or qud of one of its several emanations,
in domestic proceedings.17
It might be submitted straightforwardly that the fact that the
defendant state to an action in the courts of another state for
damages in respect of death or personal injury is alleged to have
violated either international human rights law or some other
international norm on the humane treatment of individuals serves to
deprive that state of recourse to the procedural bar otherwise posed
by state immunity. A range of alternative arguments have been
marshalled in support of this contention: that the conduct in question
cannot, by definition, be considered a sovereign act; that claims in
respect of such conduct constitute an exception to the obligation on
the forum state to accord state immunity in respect of foreign
sovereign acts; that where the foreign state is alleged to have violated
a rule of the status of a peremptory norm of general international law
(jus cogens), the obligation to accord state immunity in respect of
sovereign acts is somehow trumped, the violation is deemed to

16.
See generally LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
323-48 (7th ed. 2008); HAZEL FOX, THE LAw OF STATE IMMUNITY (2d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter Fox, STATE IMMUNITY]; Hazel Fox, InternationalLaw and Restraints on the
Exercise of Jurisdictionby National Courtsof States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 340, 344-67,
372-79 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010); Peter-Tobias Stoll, State Immunity, MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L., http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber articles-bysubject2?subject=Immunities&resultsPerPage=25 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). Unless
otherwise indicated or obvious from the context, the terms "foreign state" and "defendant
state," as used throughout this Article, should be taken to include all entities and
individuals encompassed by the definition of "state" laid down in Article 2(1)(b) of the UN
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38,
Annex, U.N. Doc. AJRES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities]. But see Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 n.12,
2290-91 (2010), for the suggestion that the immunity of the state as such and the
immunity of its officials acting in that capacity may not be one and the same thing, even
if the court "did not doubt that in some circumstances the immunity of the foreign state
extends to an individual for acts taken in his official capacity."
17.
The various arguments considered here have all been put forward by
complaining parties and on occasion restated by judges in the domestic and
international cases discussed infra, as will become evident. In terms of the secondary
literature, most of the arguments are usefully summarized and their proponents cited
in ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 301-65
(2008), Katherine Reece-Thomas and Joan Small, Human Rights and State Immunity:
Is There Immunity from Civil Liability for Torture?, 50 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2003)
and Francesca de Vittor, Immunith degli Stati dalla giurisdizione e tutela dei diritti
umani fondamentali, 85 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 573 (2002). See generally
articles cited supra note 6.
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amount to an implied waiver of immunity or the conduct cannot be
considered a sovereign act; and so on. Such arguments have to date
fared poorly, by and large, in domestic proceedings and in the only
international jurisdiction in which they have been advanced, namely
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).18 Their proponents,
however, do not accept defeat. Cases framed around this first basic
contention and any of its supporting arguments are hereafter referred
to as "human rights" cases, the quotation marks being designed to
indicate that the alleged wrong on the part of the foreign state need
not be a breach of international human rights law properly so called
but, rather, may comprise a breach of any rule of international law
relative to the humane treatment of natural persons.
Equally, in a sophistication on what boils down to the same
contention, it might be submitted before a national or international
jurisdiction in which internationally guaranteed human rights may
be relied on directly in argument that the forum state's grant of state
immunity to a defendant state sued for damages in respect of death
or personal injury occasioned by the alleged violation by that
defendant state of some international norm on the humane treatment
of individuals constitutes a violation by the forum state of the right of
access to a court implied by the plaintiffs internationally guaranteed
right to fair trial.19 There are, in turn, two versions of this argument.
The more radical claim that the grant of state immunity in civil
proceedings is per se contrary to the right to fair trial has been
categorically rejected in the European context. The ECtHR,
reiterating that the exercise of the right of access to a court implied
by Article 6(1) of the ECHR can be subject to such limitations as are
proportionate to a legitimate aim, has declared on four occasions not
only that "the grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil
proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with
international law to promote comity and good relations between
States through the respect of another State's sovereignty" 20 but also
that "measures taken by [states] which reflect generally recognized
rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in
principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on
the right of access to a court as embodied in Article 6(1)."21 In short,

See domestic and ECtHR cases cited infra notes 20-71.
18.
For the enunciation of the right of access to a court as a function of the
19.
right to fair trial, see Golder v. United Kingdom, 57 I.L.R. 200, 218 para. 36 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1975).
20.
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 24, 40 para. 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2001); see also Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, 129 I.L.R. 537, 546 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002);
Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 53, 65 para. 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001);
McElhinney v. Ireland, 123 I.L.R. 73, 85 para. 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001).
21.
Al-Adsani, 123 I.L.R. at 40 para. 56; see also Kalogeropoulou, 129 I.L.R. at
546; Fogarty, 123 I.L.R. at 65 para. 36; McElhinney, 123 I.L.R. at 85 para. 37.
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"[j]ust as the right of access to [a] court is an inherent part of the fair
trial guarantee .

. . ,

so some restrictions on access must likewise be

regarded as inherent, an example being those limitations generally
accepted by the community of nations as part of the doctrine of State
immunity."22 These statements seem not in themselves to have
aroused great controversy. As such, the grant of state immunity per
se is not the focus of this Article.
The other, more nuanced argument, on which the following
discussion will center, is that where domestic proceedings for
damages in respect of death or personal injury relate to the alleged
violation by the defendant state of international human rights law in
the strict sense or of international humanitarian law, of the
international prohibition on the commission of genocide by a state, or
of some other rule of international law on the humane treatment of
natural persons, the forum state's grant of state immunity to the
defendant state represents a disproportionate restriction on the
plaintiffs internationally guaranteed right of access to a court in that
the grant of state immunity in respect of such conduct is not, in the
words of the ECtHR, a generally recognized rule of public
international law-in other words, that this grant is not required by
international law.23 In support of the last link in the chain of
reasoning, the sorts of submissions outlined above are advanced, viz
that the impugned conduct cannot be considered a sovereign act, that
civil claims in relation to death or personal injury allegedly caused by
such conduct form an exception to the forum state's obligation to
accord state immunity in respect of sovereign acts, that state
immunity is trumped or otherwise obviated in analogous claims for
alleged violations of jus cogens, and so on. In this way, those claims
for the lifting of state immunity founded upon the allegedly wrongful
interference by the forum state of the plaintiffs international human
right of access to a court merge conceptually with claims based on the
22.
Cases cited supra note 21.
23.
It may pay to underline that the argument posited-namely that the right
of access to a court implied by the international human right to fair trial precludes the
grant of state immunity in civil actions for death or personal injury allegedly resulting
from a breach of a relevant rule of international law by the defendant state-is that the
grant of immunity would constitute a violation of international human rights law by
the forum state. Whether or not the international norm alleged to have been violated
by the defendant state is one of international human rights law is immaterial to the
analysis. It may indeed be some such norm, for example the right not to be subjected to
torture, the right to liberty or the freedom from slavery. But it may equally be some
other, non-human rights-based rule of international law relevant to the treatment of
individuals. Indeed, there is no inherent reason in this context why the respondent
state's alleged conduct need implicate international law at all. It could just as plausibly
be argued that the grant of state immunity in respect of any allegation of serious
interference by a foreign state with a person's physical or psychological integrity
constitutes a disproportionate restriction by the forum state on that person or their
next of kin's human right of access to a court.
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more straightforward contention that the grant of state immunity in
the sort of case at issue is not required, and is perhaps prohibited, by
international law. The submission that the right of access to a court
encompassed by the international human right to fair trial precludes
the forum state from according state immunity in appropriate cases
involving the alleged violation of rules of international law by the
defendant state has been rejected by the ECtHR in the specific
contexts of torture and crimes against humanity 24 and in two
subsequent domestic cases. 25 But partisans of this approach maintain
the rage, so to speak. Given that this second basic contention and its
supporting arguments ultimately merge with the first and its, these
more specifically and genuinely human rights-based claims will
hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, be subsumed under the more
general rubric of "human rights" cases.
It is worth emphasizing that it is immaterial under both the
first 26 and second2 7 basic scenarios whether or not the domestic claim
for damages relating to the alleged breach of international law by the
defendant state is framed as one for the violation of international law
as such. The wrong alleged might equally be pleaded as a gardenvariety tort, such as wrongful death, battery, or false imprisonment,
or the domestic legal equivalent. All that matters for the sake of the
argument when the domestic proceedings are said to relate to the
defendant state's breach of international law is that the conduct
alleged to constitute the relevant domestic wrong is said in parallel to
be internationally wrongful.
The present Article will not consider separately a third
hypothetical means by which international human rights law might
be relevant to the availability to a foreign state of immunity from
proceedings in a "human rights" case, namely as a function of the
express right to a remedy for breach of any of the guarantees
embodied in the respective international human rights treaties.
Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), for example, provides:
Each state Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

24.
See Kalogeropoulou, 129 I.L.R. at 547 (crimes against humanity); AlAdsani, 123 I.L.R. at 41-43 paras. 61-67 (torture).
See R6union A6rienne v. Libyan People's Socialist Jamahiriya, Cour de
25.
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for civil and criminal matters] le civ., Mar. 9, 2011,
Bull. civ. I, No. 247 (Fr.); Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
129 I.L.R. 629 (H.L. 2006) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), both discussed infra.
The reference is to the straightforward contention that, for whatever
26.
reason, state immunity is unavailable to a foreign state defendant in a "human rights"
case.
The reference is to the contention that the forum state's grant of state
27.
immunity to a foreign state defendant in a "human rights" case is incompatible with
the plaintiffs human right of access to a court.
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To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
(a)
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity;
To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his
(b)
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for
by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy;
To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
(c)
remedies when granted.

Equivalent provisions are found in the ECHR and ACHR. 28 As to
whether the right to a remedy encompasses remedies in the courts of
a state not responsible for the original violation, the Human Rights
Committee's General Comment No. 31, adopted in 2004, which deals
with, inter alia, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR, contains no suggestion that
the provision obliges states parties to provide an effective remedy for
violations of the Covenant by another state partyN9 -and this despite
the contemporaneity and controversy of the question. As regards the
analogous article in the ECHR, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR
has made it plain that the obligation on a state party to provide "an
effective remedy before a national authority" for violations of the
Convention relates only to violations which take place within the
jurisdiction of that party or with the occurrence of which that party
had some causal connection.30 On the other hand, the Committee
Against Torture, referring to the obligation imposed on a state party
by Article 14(1) of the UN Convention Against Torture3 ' to "ensure in
its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress
and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation,"
recommended to Canada in 2005, after its courts and its
representative before the Committee had rejected the application of
Article 14(1) to that state in respect of a claim alleging torture in
Iran,32 that it "should review its position under article 14 of the
Convention to ensure the provision of compensation through its civil

28.
See ECHR, supranote 12, art. 13; ACHR, supra note 13, art. 25.
29.
See Human Rights Comm., The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, General Comment 31 to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26,
2004).
30.
See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 24, 36 para. 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2001).
31.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 14(1), opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
112 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter UN Convention Against Torture].
32.
See Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 128 I.L.R. 586, 602-03 paras. 7281 (Can. Ont. C.A. 2004); Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 I.L.R. 427, 439-41
paras. 48-54 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J. 2002).
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jurisdiction to all victims of torture,"33 regardless of whether Canada
was in any way responsible for the act of torture. But this
recommendation-being only a recommendation, and coming as it
does from what, despite the deference generally shown to its views, is
ultimately merely a monitoring body, not vested by the states parties
that created it with any formal powers of legal interpretation-is not
binding on the states parties, 34 and is seemingly rejected by them.35
Moreover, even if the Committee's interpretation were indeed
binding, it stands to reason that it would be applied in essentially the
same manner as the right of access to a court enshrined in the
various international human rights instruments-in other words,
that any limitation on the availability of a civil remedy before the
courts of a state not responsible for the torture which is strictly
required by the international legal rules on state immunity would be
considered proportionate to a legitimate aim and therefore
permissible.3 6 In this way, even if the generic international human
right to a remedy for violations of international human rights law
were to be opposable to states not involved in these violations, the
analysis brought to bear in determining whether this right was
breached would merge with the analysis brought to bear, from the
perspective of international law, on any other "human rights" case.

33.
Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reps. Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee, 34th Sess., May 2-20, 2005, 5(f), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN (2005).
34.
See also Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129
I.L.R. 629, 726 para. 23 (H.L. 2006) (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.).
In addition to Canada, see for example the United Kingdom. Jones v.
35.
Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia, 129 I.L.R. 629, 659 para. 21 (Mance L.J.) (Eng.);
Jones, 129 I.L.R. at 727 para. 25 (Lord Bingham); id. at 733 para. 46, 736-37 paras.
56-57 (Lord Hoffmann) (including references to statements made by Germany and
New Zealand). For New Zealand, see Fang v Jiang [2007] NZAR 420 (HC) para. 64
(N.Z.). For the United States see United States, Reservations, Declarations, and
Understandings Under the Convention, 136 CONG. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27,
1990) ("That it is the understanding of the United States that article 14 requires a
State Party to provide a private right of action for damages only for acts of torture
committed in territory under the jurisdiction of that State Party."). The U.S.
understanding, as noted in Jones, 129 I.L.R. at 725 para. 20 (Lord Bingham), "was
expressly recognised by Germany as not touching upon the obligations of the United
States as a party to the Convention." For the German response, see Status: Convention

Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pagesNiewDetails.aspx?

src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#23 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). See

generally Andrew Byrnes, Civil Remedies for Torture Committed Abroad: An Obligation
Under the Convention Against

Torture?, in TORTURE AS

TORT: COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 513

(Craig Scott ed., 2001).
See infra Part III.A.1.(a) for a detailed account of relevant ECtHr
36.
jurisprudence.
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Next, it may make sense to specify that what we are talking
about is the infliction of death or personal injury outside the territory
of the forum state. Actions for damages in respect of death or
personal injury occasioned by a foreign state on the territory of the
forum state constitute a well-recognized exception to the forum state's
presumptive obligation to accord state immunity,3 7 even when the act
from which the death or injury results can be characterized as
inherently sovereign.3 8 (The situation may, however, be different as
regards the acts of a foreign state's armed forces.)3 9
Lastly, it remains by way of preface only to emphasize that the
following discussion focuses on civil proceedings alone. The
availability of state immunity as a bar to the prosecution in domestic
courts of foreign state officials, serving or former, in respect of
violations by them of international criminal law or of violations by the
state to which their acts are attributable of international human
rights law or some other body or rule of international law on the
humane treatment of individuals binding on states does not
necessarily implicate identical considerations to those canvassed
here. 40
37.
See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006);
Law No. 24488, June 28, 1995, B.O. art. 2(e) (Arg.); Foreign States Immunities Act, No.
196 of 1985, § 13(a) (Austl.); State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18, § 6(a) (Can.);
State Immunity Act of 1979, c. 313, § 7(a) (Sing.); Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of
1981 § 6(a) (S. Afr.); State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 5(a) (U.K.); UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 16, art. 12; European Convention on State
Immunity art. 11, May 16, 1972, 1495 U.N.T.S. 182.
38.
See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D.D.C.
1980); Schreiber v. Attorney-General of Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, paras. 32-36
(Can.); Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Areios Pagos [A.P.]
[Supreme Court] 11/2000, 129 I.L.R. 513, 517-19 (Greece); para. 8 of the commentary
to draft art. 12 of the International Law Commission (ILC)'s Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
43d Sess., Apr. 29-July 19, 1991, U.N. Doc. A/46/10, GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(1991),
reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 45, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1. Article 12 of the Draft Articles has since become Article 12
of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 16.
39.
See, e.g., State Immunity Act of 1979, c. 313, § 19(2)(a) (Sing.); State
Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 16(2) (U.K.); European Convention on State Immunity,
supra note 37, art. 31; Greek Citizens v. Federal Republic of Germany (Distomo
Massacre) Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 26, 2003 (Ger.),
translated in 129 I.L.R. 556, 560-61 (2003); Margellos v. Federal Republic of Germany,
Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio [A.E.D.] [Special Supreme Court] 6/2002 (Greece), translated
in 129 I.L.R. 525, 531-32 para. 14; McElhinney v. Ireland, 123 I.L.R. 73, 85 para. 38
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001). No such exception is found in the UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 16.
40.
For example, as made clear by the UN Human Rights Committee, the right
to fair trial "does not provide a right for an individual to require that the State party
criminally prosecute another person." Rodriguez Veiga v. Uruguay, Human Rights
Comm., Dec. No. 322/1988, para. 6.4, UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (July 18, 1994);
S.E. v. Argentina, Human Rights Comm., Dec. No. 275/1988, para. 5.5, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/38/D/275/1988 (Mar. 26, 1990); H.C.M.A. v. Netherlands, Human Rights
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III. THE CURRENT STRATEGIC Focus ON STATE IMMUNITY
A. HeadingNowhere
The current strategic focus on state immunity on the part of
advocates for redress for those killed or physically injured as a result
of international wrongs by states is likely to yield precious little in
either abstract legal or material terms in the short or long run. This
is not to suggest that attempts by plaintiffs to circumvent the
immunity from national proceedings owed to foreign states in respect
of acts of an inherently sovereign character are doomed to fail in each
and every national jurisdiction. For example, it remains to be seen
after Samantar whether actions brought in U.S. courts under the
common law against individual serving or former state officials in
respect of conduct performed in their official capacity 4 1 prove a rare
growth area, in spite of the current and likely future position under
customary international law, although there is reason to think that
any possible growth will be marginal. 4 2 Nor is it to predict that no
government will legislate to abrogate state immunity in "human
rights" cases. Rather, what is argued is as follows. In the short term,
it is only in a tiny minority of national jurisdictions that claims for
damages in respect of death or personal injury allegedly occasioned
by a foreign state in violation of some international norm on the
humane treatment of individuals stand any real chance of overcoming
the immunity of the defendant state from proceedings. In the long
term, it is likely that decisions by international courts will continue to
discourage, and may even put paid once and for all to, the
circumvention of state immunity in cases of this sort in national
courts and the legislative abrogation of such immunity in respect of
the same. Finally, even in the handful of instances in which the
defendant state's immunity from proceedings is overcome, other
hurdles-most formidably, the immunity of most of that state's
property in the forum state from post-judgment measures of
constraint and the need to rely on foreign courts to enforce the

Comm., Dec. No. 213/1986, para. 11.6, UN Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/213/1986 (Mar. 30, 1989).
That is, there is no internationally-guaranteed human right which the forum state
could be said to violate by accepting state immunity as a procedural bar to the criminal
prosecution of a foreign state official implicated in the alleged mistreatment of the
plaintiff or deceased.
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court did not doubt that "in some
41.
circumstances the immunity of the foreign state extends to an individual for acts taken
in his official capacity." 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290-91 (2010). In other words, as noted by
the Court, "[e]ven if a suit is not governed by the [FSIA], it may still be barred by
foreign sovereign immunity under the common law." Id. at 2292. The question remains
in what circumstances this might be.
See id. at 2292 (discussing the unlikelihood of success of "artful pleading" to
42.
circumvent the immunity of the foreign state itself under the FSIA).
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judgments in question in foreign jurisdictions-stand in the way of
the successful securing of redress.
The following discussion is divided into three parts. First
considered are the obstacles to the circumvention by national or
international courts of what would otherwise be the foreign state's
entitlement to immunity from proceedings in "human rights" cases in
respect of acts by the foreign state of an inherently sovereign
character. Next examined are the obstacles to states' legislative
abrogation of a foreign state's immunity from domestic proceedings in
"human rights" cases. The final focus is on the obstacles to obtaining
redress from a foreign state in such cases even in the unlikely event
that its immunity from proceedings can be overcome. The gist of all
three sections is that the current approach is likely to head nowhere.
1.

Obstacles to the Circumvention of Immunity from Proceedings
by National or International Courts

(a) The Case Law of the ECtHR
One of the chief obstacles to the success of the contention that
the forum state is under no international duty to accord state
immunity in civil claims against foreign states in respect of alleged
breaches of international law causing death or personal injury is the
case law of the ECtHR, which exerts an influence that goes beyond
the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe.
In Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, a Grand Chamber of the

ECtHR dismissed the argument that the grant of state immunity to
bar civil proceedings in respect of allegations of torture by the
respondent state violated the right of access to a court secured to the
applicant by Article 6(1) of the ECHR.4 3 The Court, emphasizing that
the exercise of the right of access to a court could be subject to such
limitations as were proportionate to a legitimate aim, reiterated both
that "[t]he grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings
pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law"44
and that "measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect
generally recognized rules of public international law on State
immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a
disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court embodied
in Article 6 § 1."4 It all came down to whether international law
required the forum state to accord state immunity in any given case,
and the Grand Chamber held by the narrowest of margins that,

43.
2001). The
44.
45.

Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 24, 43 para. 67 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
margin was a razor-thin nine votes to eight.
Id. at 40 para. 54.
Id. at 40 para. 56.
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despite the fact that the international prohibition on torture had
acquired the status of jus cogens, there was "[not] yet acceptance in
international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to
immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged torture
committed
outside
the
forum
State."4 6
Quite
simply,
"[njotwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture
in international law, the Court [was] unable to discern in the
international instruments, judicial authorities or other materials
before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of
international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in
the courts of another State where acts of torture are alleged."47 The
UK legislation granting immunity in the instant case was "not
inconsistent with those limitations generally accepted by the
community of nations as part of the doctrine of State immunity."48 As
such, the application of the legislation by the English courts to uphold
a foreign state's plea of state immunity in a civil action alleging
torture by that state abroad "[could not] be said to have amounted to
an unjustified restriction on the applicant's access to a court." 49
In the subsequent case of Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, the ECtHR
(First Section)-reaffirming that the grant of state immunity as
required by international law represented a permissible restriction on
the exercise of the relevant right-held similarly that despite the
applicant's claim that the prohibition on crimes against humanity
enjoyed the character of jus cogens, there was "[not] yet acceptance in
international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to
immunity in respect of civil claims for damages brought against them
in another State for crimes against humanity." 0
In neither Al-Adsani nor Kalogeropoulou did the ECtHR
preclude the future development of customary international law in
favor of the unavailability of state immunity in civil claims relating to
torture and crimes against humanity.5 1 Nor did it venture an opinion
on the availability of state immunity as a bar to actions for damages
in respect of violations of other international norms on the treatment
of individuals. The Court's judgments have nonetheless generated a
dynamic which in practice is inimical to attempts, whether based
specifically on the right of access to a court or on more general
grounds, to overcome state immunity in civil proceedings-in domestic
courts for alleged breaches of international law by the defendant
state causing death or personal injury.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 43 para. 66.
Id. at 42 para. 61.
Id. at 43 para. 66.
Id. at 43 para. 67.
Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, 129 I.L.R. 537, 547 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002).
See explicitly Kalogeropoulou, 129 I.L.R. 537.
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Within the espace juridique of the ECHR, calls for the judicial
circumvention of state immunity in domestic proceedings of this sort
are now stymied by a sort of "chicken and egg" conundrum created by
Al-Adsani and Kalogeropoulou, as follows.
The courts of the states parties to the Convention set great store
by the judgments of the ECtHR. In Margellos v. Germany, involving a
claim for damages against Germany for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed during the Second World War, the
Greek Special Supreme Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio) was
persuaded by, inter alia, Al-Adsani to uphold the availability to
Germany of immunity from proceedings. 52 In the subsequent Greek

Citizens v. FederalRepublic of Germany (the Distomo Massacre case),
in which the plaintiffs attempted to enforce in the German courts a
default judgment rendered against Germany prior to Al-Adsani and
Margellos by a court in Livadia in Greece and relating again to war
crimes dating from the Second World War,5 3 the German Supreme
Court (Bundesgerichtshof), having come to the provisional conclusion
that state immunity should have prevented the Greek court from
exercising jurisdiction, 54 found that any possible initial "objective
doubts" as it might have entertained were "removed" not only by
Margellos-which, guided by the intervening decision of the ECtHR
in Al-Adsani, rejected (albeit in a different case) the reasoning of the
Livadia court-but also by the later Kalogeropoulou, in which the
ECtHR rejected a challenge to the refusal of the Greek Minister of
Justice and the German authorities to enforce the Livadia court's
judgment.55 The decision of the Supreme Court was upheld on appeal

52.
Margellos v. Federal Republic of Germany, Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio
[A.E.D.] [Special Supreme Court] 6/2002 (Greece), translatedin 129 I.L.R. 525, 529-33
paras. 12-15. Although the case involved conduct by Germany on Greek territory, the
court held that no "territorial tort" exception to state immunity applied in respect of
the acts of a foreign state's armed forces. Id. at 531-32 para. 14.
53.
See Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Protodikeia
Livadia [Mon. Pr.] [District Court Livadia] 137/1997 (Greece). The judgment became
final when it was upheld, by seven votes to four, by the Greek Supreme Court in
Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme
Court] 11/2000 (Greece), translatedin 129 I.L.R. 513. Like the decision of the district
court, the Supreme Court's decision predates Al-Adsani and Margellos, and the latter
effectively overturns it. The Minister of Justice's refusal to authorize enforcement of
the decision against German property in Greece (believing as he did that the judgment
was obtained in violation of the international rules on immunity from proceedings),
along with Germany's refusal to enforce the decision in Germany, formed the factual
bases of the challenge in Kalogeropoulou, 129 I.L.R. 537.
54.
Greek Citizens v. Federal Republic of Germany (Distomo Massacre)
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 26, 2003 (Ger.), translated in
129 I.L.R. 556, 559-61.
55.
Id. at 561-62.
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56 In
to the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassunsgericht).
the UK, where the courts are required by the Human Rights Act to
take into account the ECtHR's jurisprudence,5 7 the House of Lords in
Jones v. Saudi Arabia, a claim for damages in respect of alleged
torture, not only adopted the reasoning of the ECtHR in Al-Adsani
and Kalogeropoulou in specific relation to Article 6(1) of the
Convention but also drew strong support for its own eventual finding
as to the present state of the customary international law of state
immunity in civil actions for torture from the majority's finding in AlAdsani on the same contested point. 58 Most recently, in a suit
involving not the victims or their next-of-kin but instead the insurers
of the former French airline UTA to recover sums paid out by them,
the French Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) recalled and
applied Al-Adsani's take on Article 6(1) of the ECHR to uphold
Libya's immunity from proceedings in respect of the destruction via
sabotage of UTA flight 772 over Niger in 1989 (the allegation being
not that Libya was directly responsible but rather that it had neither
punished nor disavowed the act).59
Now, it is a truism that states parties to the ECHR are entitled
to give effect to the human rights guaranteed by the Convention in a
manner going beyond the minimum regional standard expounded by
the ECtHR. But the consequence of any such move when it comes to
state immunity would be an international wrong, in the form of the
denial of state immunity to the defendant state in a manner not in
accordance with international law. This is something Italy is likely to
learn to its chagrin, after Germany's initiation of proceedings against
it in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in late 2008 in respect of
the application by the Italian courts, in Ferrini v. Germany and
subsequent cases,6 0 of a putative rule of customary international law

56.
See Greek Citizens v. Federal Republic of Germany (Distomo Massacre),
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 2006
(Ger.), translated in 135 I.L.R. 186, 191-92.
57.
See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 2(1)(a) (Eng.). In Jones, Lord Bingham
explained that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords-formerly the United
Kingdom's highest appellate court, now replaced by the UK Supreme Court-"would
ordinarily follow . .. a decision [of the ECtHR] unless it found the court's reasoning to
be unclear or unsound, or the law had changed significantly since the date of the
decision," none of which was so in the instant case. Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 I.L.R. 629, 723 para. 18 (H.L. 2006) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.).
58.
See Jones, 129 I.L.R. at 722-23 para. 18 (Lord Bingham); id. at 731, paras.
40-41, 736, para. 55 (Lord Hoffmann). The three other Lords agreed with Lords
Bingham and Hoffmann.
59.
See Runion Arienne v. Libyan People's Socialist Jamahiriya, Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for civil and criminal matters] le civ., Mar. 9, 2011,
Bull. civ. I, No. 247 (Fr.).
60.
See Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Corte di Cassazione [Cass.]
[supreme court in civil and criminal matters] Mar. 11, 2004 (It.); Federal Republic of
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said by those courts to be "in the process of being formed" 61 whereby
state immunity is unavailable in respect of alleged violations of jus
cogens. Especially given the last, it is likely that the courts of states
parties to the ECHR-with the exception, that is, of the Italian
courts, although even these are now having second thoughts 62 -will
leave it to the ECtHR to make the first move, after which the parties
would be not merely permitted but indeed obliged to deny immunity
in cognate cases.
In turn, the ECtHR, in the event that it is ever required to
retake the pulse of state practice on the issue, is unlikely to conclude,
if and when confronted by the generally consistent upholding of state
immunity in such cases by the courts of states parties to the
Convention, that customary international law no longer permits the
latter.
In short, Al-Adsani and Kalogeropoulou have given rise to a
customary international legal feedback loop. The ECtHR holds that
states do not currently accept that state immunity is unavailable as a
bar to domestic proceedings for damages in respect of death or
personal injury allegedly caused by an international wrong at the
hands of the defendant state. As a result, the courts of nearly all of
the member states of the Council of Europe dismiss legal arguments
in favor of the unavailability of state immunity in such cases. In turn,
it stands to reason that the ECtHR, and indeed other relevant
international jurisdictions, will hold in future that states do not
accept that state immunity is unavailable as a bar to domestic
proceedings for damages in respect of death or personal injury
allegedly caused by an international wrong at the hands of the
defendant state. And so on in scecula sceculorum.
In addition, we are already seeing the courts of states outside the
Council of Europe, when similarly faced with the submission that
international law does not require the grant of state immunity in civil
claims for torture, looking for guidance to the decisions of the ECtHR
in Al-Adsani and Kalogeropoulou or to subsequent decisions of the
courts of states parties to the ECHR in analogous cases-especially,
in the common law world, to the influential conclusion of the House of
Lords in Jones.

Germany v. Mantelli, Corte di Cassazione [Cass.] [supreme court for civil and criminal
matters] May 29, 2008 (It.), translated in I.L.D.C. 1037 (IT 2008); Italy v. Milde, Corte
di Cassazione [Cass.] [supreme court for civil and criminal matters] Jan. 13, 2009 (It.),
translated in 128 I.L.D.C. 1224 (IT 2009), involving civil proceedings attached to a
criminal prosecution. For further consideration of the current ICJ proceedings between
Germany and Italy, see infra Part III.A.1.(e).
61.
Lozano v. Italy, Corte di Cassazione [Cass.] [supreme court for civil and
criminal matters] Jul. 24, 2008 (It.), translated in I.L.D.C. 1085 (IT 2008), para. 6
(referring explicitly and additionally to the civil liability of a foreign state).
For a discussion of the Italian jurisprudence, see infra Part III.A.1.(e).
62.
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The year after Al-Adsani, in the torture case of Bouzari v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Justice Swinton of the Superior Court of
Justice of the Canadian province of Ontario looked to, among other
things, the ECtHR's ruling, emphasizing the majority's words that,
"[n]otwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture
in international law, the Court [was] unable to discern in the
international instruments, judicial authorities or other materials
before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of
international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in
the courts of another State where acts of torture are alleged."63 On
this and other grounds, Justice Swinton concluded that, as it stood,
international law recognized no exception to state immunity in
respect of civil actions for torture committed outside the forum state
and that any recognition by her of such an exception would place
Canada in breach of customary international law. 6 4 (Additionally, she
relied on Al-Adsani to hold that the grant of state immunity in the
circumstances of the case did not violate the right to fair trial
guaranteed by Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.)65 The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld this decision
and agreed with Justice Swinton's reasoning. 66 Next, in Fang v.
Jiang, Justice Randerson in the High Court of New Zealand was
persuaded by Jones that the common law of New Zealand, which
permitted direct reliance on the customary international law of state
immunity, obliged him to dismiss an application for leave to serve the
statement of claim and notice of proceeding ex juris in a civil action
for torture against, inter alia,the former head of state of the People's
Republic of China. 67 The two later torture-claim decisions in Zhang v.
Zemin in the Australian state of New South Wales ultimately rested
on a point of statutory construction.6 8 That said, Justice Latham in
the New South Wales Supreme Court relied on Jones, Bouzari, Fang,
and Al-Adsani itself to conclude that, as a matter of international
law, there was "no exception to foreign State immunity for civil
proceedings alleging acts of torture committed in a foreign State."6 9
Nor is it without relevance that, in the New South Wales Court of
Appeal, Chief Justice Spigelman (with whom President Allsop and
Chief Justice at Common Law McClellan agreed) referred to Al-

63.
Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 I.L.R. 427, 445 para. 69 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J. 2002) (quoting Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 24 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2001)).
64.
Id. at 443 para. 63, 446 para. 73, 449 para. 86, 450 para. 89.
Id. at 441 para. 55.
65.
Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 128 I.L.R. 586 (Can. Ont. C.A. 2004).
66.
See Fang v Jiang [2007] NZAR 420 (HC) paras. 62-72 (N.Z.).
67.
See Zhang v Zemin [2010 NSWCA 255 (Austl. N.S.W. C.A.); Zhang v Zemin
68.
[2008] NSWSC 1296 (Austl. N.S.W. S.C.).
Zhang [20081 NSWSC paras. 35-39 (quote para. 39).
69.
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Adsani, Kalogeropoulou, Jones, Bouzari, and Fang as forming "a
considerable body of authority denying [the court's exercise ofJ
jurisdiction, despite the recognition of the prohibition of torture as jus
cogens."70 Subsequently, in the further Ontario case of Arar v. Syrian
Arab Republic (in which, despite Bouzari, the plaintiff was "seeking a
second kick at the can," in the words of counsel)7 1 , Justice Echlin
pointed to Jones, as well as to U.S. case law, to conclude that any
decision by him to read into Canada's State Immunity Act an
exception for civil claims alleging state-sponsored torture "would put
Canada out of step with the international order at this time." 72
In this way, the customary international legal feedback loop set
in train by the case law of the ECtHR is perpetuating-insofar as the
grant of state immunity by the courts of states from outside the
Council of Europe supports a future conclusion by the ECtHR or some
other international judicial or similar organ that states do not
presently accept the unavailability of state immunity in "human
rights" cases-a conclusion which in turn promises to influence
national courts both within and without the espace juridique of the
ECHR.
(b) The Statutory Embodiment of State Immunity in Certain
Jurisdictions
State immunity finds statutory embodiment in certain key
jurisdictions in the form of a general grant of immunity from civil
proceedings qualified by an exhaustive enumeration of exceptions.
Legislative schemes along these lines currently govern the
availability of state immunity in the courts of the United States, the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Israel, Pakistan,
Singapore, and South Africa.73 In none of these states does the
relevant legislation contain an exception to the immunity of a
defendant state in relation to suits in respect of death or personal
injury alleged to result from the violation by that state of some
international rule on the humane treatment of individuals. Not only
does this militate against the success of "human rights" cases in these
jurisdictions themselves. The absence of favorable case law from key
jurisdictions also serves seriously to undermine similar claims in
other jurisdictions, both national and international, given that the
alleged unavailability under customary international law of state
70.
Zhang [2010] NSWCA para. 121.
71.
Arar v. Syrian Arab Republic, (2005) 127 C.R.R.2d 252, para. 9 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.).
72.
Id. paras. 23, 31 (quote para. 31).
73.
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
(2006); Foreign States Immunity Law, 5769-2008 (Isr.); State Immunity Ordinance,
No. 6 of 1981, PAK. CODE (Pak.); statutes cited supra note 37.
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immunity in such cases ultimately hinges on whether there is
sufficient and sufficiently representative state practice and opinio
juris to this effect.
When a domestic court is required by unambiguous legislation to
accord state immunity in the absence of any relevant statutory
exception, it is-except where some other, competing domestic legal
constraint, perhaps constitutional, is engaged thereby-beside the
point in proceedings before that court whether or not, absent such an
exception in the instant case, international law considers the
impugned conduct an inherently sovereign act or recognizes an
exception to state immunity specifically in respect of such conduct or
in respect of violations of jus cogens or for any other reason. The
domestic court will simply apply the domestic law, whatever the
consequences for the forum state under international law. This has
been seen in the United States in a range of suits involving the
alleged violation by the defendant state of some international rule,
even of the status of jus cogens. Examples include Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,74 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina,7 5 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,76 and Smith v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." It is equally for this

reason that, prior to the coming into force of the UK's Human Rights
Act, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal of England and
Wales dismissed the personal injury claim in respect of allegations of
torture in Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait,78 with the House of

Lords refusing leave to appeal; that, failing any argument under
Canada's Bill of Rights, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and
Court of Appeal dismissed the analogous claim in Bouzari,79 with the

74.
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433-38,
443 (1989).
75.
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir.
1992).
76.
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1171-76 (D.C. Cir.
1992). While the majority did not conclusively determine whether the FSIA applied to
the facts of the case, which predated the Act, they held that, in the event that the FSIA
did apply, the court lacked jurisdiction, since the impugned acts did not fall within any
of the exceptions to state immunity recognized in the Act.
77.
Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir.
1996).
78.
See Al-Adsani v. Gov't of Kuwait, 103 I.L.R. 420, 427-31 (EWHC (QB)
1995) (Eng.); Al-Adsani v. Gov't of Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536, 542-44 (EWCA (Civ) 1996)
(Stuart-Smith L.J.) (Eng.); id. at 547-50 (Ward L.J). As made clear in Jones, a more
nuanced analysis is called for today when rights under the Human Rights Act are
pleaded. Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom Saudi Arabia, 129 I.L.R. 629,
719-20, para. 13 (H.L. 2006) (Lord Bingham) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
79.
See Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 128 I.L.R. 586, 599 paras. 57-59,
601 para. 67, 605 para. 90, 608 para. 104 (Can. Ont. C.A. 2004); Bouzari v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 124 I.L.R. 427, 433 para. 18, 438 para. 41, 446 para. 73, 450 para. 90
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J. 2002).
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Supreme Court of Canada refusing leave to appeal, and that the first
of these courts also dismissed the later claim in Arar;80 and that the
New South Wales Court of Appeal dismissed the equivalent action in
Zhang.8 1 Nor have attempts in these jurisdictions to shoehorn claims
in respect of torture or other alleged mistreatment in breach of
international law into one or other of the enumerated statutory
exceptions to state immunity been looked on with favor by the
courts. 82
In turn, the upshot of such dismissals is a dearth of state
practice in support of the denial of state immunity in cognate cases,83
a fact which in further turn stands to influence national jurisdictions
where state immunity legislation is not necessarily the end of the
story84 or where there is no such legislation (recourse being had to
customary international law, perhaps via common law,85 or treaty),
as well as relevant international jurisdictions.
It should nonetheless be noted that, in an exception to the
general pattern in both U.S. and other national jurisdictions, a
relevant legislative exception to statutory state immunity exists in
the United States with respect to what today number four foreign
states. Formerly under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), originally introduced
by § 221 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

See Arar v. Syrian Arab Republic (2005), 127 C.R.R.2d 252, paras. 21-22,
80.
25-26, 28, 30-31 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
See Zhang v Zemin [2010] NSWCA 255, paras. 153, 157-64, 172 (Austl.
81.
N.S.W. C.A.).
See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1993); Siderman v.
82.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1992); Princz v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-75 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Smith, 101 F.3d at 242-46;
Bouzari, 128 I.L.R. at 597-99 paras. 42-55; Bouzari, 124 I.L.R. at 433-36 paras. 18-34.
83.
This is not to suggest that the dismissal of a domestic claim by reference to
domestic law alone can be taken as support for the customary international legal status
quo. On the contrary, where the content of customary international law has no bearing
on the decision, nothing by way of opiniojuris can be gleaned. It is simply, rather, to
highlight the resulting lack of state practice in favour of a putative customary rule
denying the availability of state immunity in such cases. Nor, it should be added, is any
of this to say that a domestic court might not proffer a view on the content of the
customary international law of state immunity even as it ultimately applies, per force,
the statute and only the statute. Any such dicta would naturally go towards either the
lex lata or the putative lex ferenda. In practice, however, judicial economy and judicial
caution make unnecessary conclusions on contentious points of customary
international law a rarity in domestic proceedings.
84.
Examples include the United Kingdom, after the coming into effect of the
Human Rights Act, and Canada, in light of its Bill of Rights. See Canadian Bill of
Rights, 1960, c. 44 (Can.); Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
85.
Examples include New Zealand and, after the Supreme Court's decision in
Samantar,the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts over individual state officials, serving
and former. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
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1996,86 and now under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, inserted by way of
§ 1083(b)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008,87 the immunity from proceedings to which a foreign state
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism8 8 would otherwise be
entitled under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) is
abrogated in respect of actions for damages for personal injury or
death caused to a U.S. national or, under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, to a
member of the U.S. armed forces or U.S. government employee or
contractor acting within the scope of their employment by that
foreign state's act of torture, extra-judicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
or hostage-taking or by its provision of material support or resources
for any such act.8 9 There are only four states currently designated as
state sponsors of terrorism, namely Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.9 0
But this legislation, although presenting an opportunity in its own
right to certain plaintiffs, cannot be said to manifest an opinio juris
on the part of the United States that customary international law
permits the denial of state immunity in civil proceedings against any
state in respect of the conduct specified.9 ' The exception therefore
cannot contribute to a customary international rule to this effect. The
same goes for what is reported to be retaliatory legislation to similar
ends on the respective parts of Cuba and Iran. 92
(c)

The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property (2004)

On December 2, 2004, the UN General Assembly, "[b]elieving
that an international convention on the jurisdictional immunities of

86.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) § 221 (formerly codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006), now
repealed).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-181,
87.
122 Stat. 341 (2008), § 1083(b)(1) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605A (2008)).
States are designated as state sponsors of terrorism by means of a
88.
determination by the Secretary of State pursuant to § 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2405(j) (2006), § 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2371
(2006), or § 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d) (2006).
See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31258, SUITS AGAINST
89.
TERRORIST STATES BY VICTIMS 69-74 (2008) (listing judgments rendered against such
states up to August 8, 2008).
90.
States formerly on the list comprise Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. State
Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ c14151.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2011).
91.
See also Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 24, 42-43 para. 64 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2001); Fox, STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 16, at 149; Vittor, supra note 17, at
607; Joanne Foakes & Elizabeth Wilmshurst, State Immunity: The United Nations
Convention and Its Effect 8 para. 34 (Chatham House Int'l Law Program Briefing
Paper, 2005).
See ELSEA, supra note 89, at 66-67.
92.
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States and their property . . . would contribute to the codification and

development of international law and the harmonization of practice
in this area," and "[t]aking into account developments in State
practice," adopted without a vote the UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2004).93 The
adoption of the Convention marked the culmination of a process
formally begun in 1977, when the Assembly invited the International
Law Commission (ILC) to commence work on the topic of
jurisdictional immunities of states and their property. 94 The
Convention, which to date has attracted twenty-eight signatories and
ten states parties, will enter into force a month after the deposit of
the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession.9 5 The provisions of the Convention on immunity from
proceedings are organized around a general grant of immunity
qualified by enumerated exceptions which for the purposes of the
Convention are exhaustive.
Absent from the Convention is any exception to state immunity
for civil proceedings in respect of death or personal injury alleged to
have been inflicted in breach of international law in general or of jus
cogens in particular. The absence reflects a decision taken early on in
the process by which the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of
states and their property adopted by the ILC in 1991 were worked up
into the Convention. When the open-ended Working Group of the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly convened in 1999 to
examine outstanding issues relating to the ILC's draft articles,9 6 it
considered whether to take up a matter raised in the appendix to the
report to the ILC earlier that year of the Commission's own Working
Group on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,9 7
"namely the question of the existence or nonexistence of immunity in
the case of violation by a State of jus cogens norms of international
law."9 8 "It was generally agreed," however, by the delegates to the
Working Group of the Sixth Committee, "that this issue, although of
current interest, did not really fit into the . . . draft articles."99

Moreover, the issue "did not seem to be ripe enough for the Working

UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 16.
93.
94.
See G.A. Res. 32/151, 1 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/151 (Dec. 19, 1977).
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 16, Art. 31(1).
95.
See G.A. Res. 53/98, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/98 (Dec. 8, 1998).
96.
97.
See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 51st Sess., May 3-July 23, 1999, App.,
U.N. Doc. A/54/10; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 1 (1999), reprinted in [19991 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.1 (Part 2).
98.
Chairman of the Working Group, Convention on JurisdictionalImmunities
of States and Their Property, para. 46, UN Doc. A/C.6/54[L.12 (Nov. 12, 1999) (by
Gerhard Hafner).
Id. para. 47.
99.
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Group to engage in a codification exercise over it."100 The chairman of
the Sixth Committee's Working Group therefore concluded as follows:
In the light of the discussions held in the Working Group of the Sixth
Committee, it does not seem advisable to include this matter among the
10 1
issues to be covered by the forthcoming considerations on the topic.

No objection to this manner of proceeding was subsequently raised in
the Sixth Committee itself, and the Japanese delegate who
introduced the draft of what became General Assembly resolution
54/101 of December 9, 1999 ("Convention on jurisdictional immunities
of States and their property") explicitly supported the exclusion of
future discussion of the matter in the drafting of the proposed
Convention. 102
The preamble to the Convention affirms "that the rules of
customary international law continue to govern matters not regulated
by the provisions of the . . . Convention," thereby leaving open the

theoretical possibility that an exception to state immunity exists for
actions for damages for death or personal injury alleged to have been
caused by a foreign state in violation of international law generally or
of jus cogens specifically. In this light, on ratification in 2009,
Sweden, in words which reproduce almost verbatim Norway's
declaration of 2006, declared its understanding that "the Convention
is without prejudice to any future international legal development
concerning the protection of human rights."1 03 Notwithstanding this,
however, the practical effect of the noninclusion in the Convention
(which is viewed as by and large a codification of customary
international law) 104 of any such exception is very likely to be the
undermining of arguments in favor of its existence. 10 5 This effect has
already begun to be seen. In Jones, the Lords drew support from the
Convention for their conclusion that customary international law did
not recognize an exception to state immunity along the lines
submitted by the claimants. Lord Bingham, the senior Law Lord,

100.
Id.
101.
Id. para. 67.
1-36, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.36
102.
See U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 36th mtg.,
(Apr. 24, 2000).
103.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Convention on JurisdictionalImmunities of
Doc.
States and Their Property: Depository Notification, Sweden, U.N.
C.N.912.2009.TREATIES-1 (Dec. 24, 2009); U.N. Secretary-General, Convention On
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property: Depository Notification,
Norway, U.N. Doc. C.N.280.2006.TREATIES-2 (Apr. 6, 2006), both available at Status:
United Nations Convention on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property,
supra, note 35.
See, e.g., Hirschhorn v. Romania, App. No. 29294/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 8
104.
(2007) (Caflisch & Ziemele, JJ., concurring); see also FOX, STATE IMMUNITY, supra note
16, at 4, 11-12, 35, 167, 373; Foakes & Wilmshurst, supra note 91, at 10 para. 45.
105.
See Brown, supra note 6, at 212; Hall, supra note 8; Lorna McGregor, State
Immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 437 (2006).
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describing the Convention as "the most authoritative statement
available on the current international understanding of the limits of
state immunity in civil cases," held that "the absence of a torture or
jus cogens exception [was] wholly inimical to the claimants'
contention."10 6 Justice Randerson in Fang and Justice Latham in
Zhang subsequently quoted Lord Bingham's dictum with approval.1 0 7
The former, referring to the Convention as "a very recent expression
of the consensus of nations on this topic," expressly "agree[d] with the
House of Lords that the absence of a torture or jus cogens exception to
state immunity in the UN Immunities Convention 2004 speaks
powerfully against the plaintiffs' argument." 0 8
Moreover, as more states become party to the Convention, with
its presumptive grant of immunity qualified only by express
exceptions, the number of national jurisdictions in which the
availability of state immunity is governed by a statutory arrangement
of the sort discussed above, and in which no exception to immunity is
recognized in respect of civil actions for death or personal injury
alleged to be caused in violation of international law or more
specifically of jus cogens, is bound to increase, perhaps significantly.
The practical consequence of this will be a continuing want of state
practice in support of arguments in favor of such an exception.
(d) The Unpersuasiveness of the Arguments
Even leaving aside the foregoing obstacles, perhaps the most
basic reason why attempts to circumvent state immunity in "human
rights" cases are likely to lead nowhere in the long run is that no
knock-down argument can seemingly be marshalled in support. As a
matter of both first principles and common-sense attractiveness to a
court, the various possible contentions stand little chance of carrying
all before them, even if there is always the possibility that a court or
judge here or there may be persuaded.
One of the main arguments in the repertoire of the opponents of
the grant of state immunity in the sorts of cases under discussion
here is that acts in violation of international law itself are ipso facto
to be characterized not as inherently sovereign acts ("acts jure
imperii," as the terminology has it), which would attract immunity,
but instead as acts which, although committed by a state in the
instant case, are the sort of thing a private person could do ("acts jure

106.
Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 I.L.R.
629, 727 para. 26 (Lord Bingham) (H.L. 2006) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); see also
id. at 733 para. 47, 741 para. 71 (Lord Hoffmann).
107.
See Zhang v Zemin [2008] NSWSC 1296, paras. 35-36 (Austl. N.S.W. S.C.);
Fang v Jiang [2007] NZAR 420 (HC) paras. 49, 62-63, 65 (N.Z.).
108.
Fang [2007] NZAR para. 65.
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gestionis").0 9 This, however, is hardly compelling. For a start, it
requires the court in question to look to the nature, rather than to the
purpose, of the impugned act to determine whether it should be
qualified as jure imperii or jure gestionis; and while this approach to
the legal qualification of the relevant conduct is seemingly today the
most widely accepted, it is far from universally so.110 Secondly and
more tellingly, applying the "nature" test, the argument is logically
hoist on its own petard. The essence of the contention, namely that
international law cannot possibly be taken to consider as inherently
sovereign acts in violation of international law itself, is dependent on
characterizing the impugned conduct as "the international wrong of
X," rather than as simply "the act of X." The problem with this,
however, is that-leaving aside international criminal prohibitions
and those norms directed at international organizations and certain
organized armed groups-only states can commit international
wrongs.11 1 And if only states can commit international wrongs, such
acts must be inherently sovereign-that is, necessarily jure imperii.
Conversely, if one characterizes the impugned conduct as simply "the
act of X', the argument that it must be qualified as an act jure
gestionis by mere virtue of its being a breach of international law falls
away. In the final analysis, all this is no more than a complicated way
of saying what national courts have long said in the context of
breaches of international law generally and more recently in specific
relation to torture, namely that the argument that state conduct in
violation of international law cannot be an act jure imperii, and
therefore cannot attract state immunity, mistakenly brings a
normative approach to bear on what is intended to be a purely
descriptive exercise. 112 In short, whether or not state conduct is

109.
See supra Part II.
See, e.g., UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 16, art.
110.
2(2) ("In determining whether a contract or transaction is a 'commercial transaction' . .
. reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but
its purpose should also be taken into account if the parties to the contract or
transaction have so agreed, or if, in the practice of the State of the forum, that purpose
is relevant to determining the noncommercial character of the contract or
transaction.").
It may be that there is room for manoeuvre when it comes to those few
111.
international norms, such as the prohibition on genocide, which are directed not only at
both states and individuals but also, as regards the latter, at both state functionaries
and non-state actors. When it comes, however, to torture, the wording of Article 1 of
the UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 31, rules any such possibility out. See
Jones, 129 I.L.R. at 724 para. 19 (Lord Bingham); id. 743-44 paras. 79-85 (Lord
Hoffman); see also Zhang v Zemin [2010] NSWCA 255, paras. 166-71 (Allsop P) (Austl.
N.S.W. C.A.); Zhang [2008] NSWSC paras. 27-28; Fang [2007] NZAR paras. 52-60,
62-63.
In specific relation to torture, see Zhang [2010] NSWCA paras. 169, 171
112.
(Allsop P), Fang [2007] NZAR paras. 38, 62-63, 72, Jones, 129 I.L.R. at 718-19 para.
12 (Lord Bingham) and id. at 742-44 paras. 72-85 (Lord Hoffman).
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inherently sovereign, and therefore capable of attracting state
immunity to the benefit of a defendant state in foreign civil
proceedings, is separate from whether it is internationally lawful.113
The jus cogens argument is even weaker. While it seems no
longer true that the status of a prohibition as a peremptory norm of
general international law goes solely to the norm's applicability in the
first place (viz to the question whether a state may derogate from
such a norm) and not to the consequences of its breach,11 4 it remains
the case that jus cogens has no necessary implications for the
availability of a remedy for such breach in any chosen forum." 5 This
is not to deny, as the Italian Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione)
in Ferrinithought relevant,"16 that Article 41 of the ILC's Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides
that "[n]o State shall recognize as lawful," "nor render aid or
assistance in maintaining," a situation created by a "serious breach of
an obligation arising under a peremptory norm." But it takes an
exceptionally adventurous court to read this as a mandate to deny
state immunity in the sorts of civil claims at issue here, even leaving
aside the question whether in each case the alleged international
wrong represents "a gross or systematic failure by the responsible

113.
In this regard, see also the dismissals in 2003 and 2004 respectively by the
French Court of Cassation of claims for remuneration (rather than for compensation for
injury suffered) brought against Germany by plaintiffs who had been used as slave
labour in German territory during the Second World War after their arrest and
transportation by the German authorities in occupied France. In Bucheron v. Federal
Republic of Germany, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] le
civ., Dec. 16, 2003, Bull. civ. I, No. 258 (Fr.), the Court of Cassation upheld Germany's
immunity from suit on the ground that consigning the plaintiff to forced labour in an
enemy country was an act jure imperii by the German occupation authorities.
Similarly, in Gimenez-Esposito v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for civil and criminal matters] le civ., June 2, 2004, Bull. civ. I,
No. 158 (Fr.), the Court upheld the immunity from proceedings accorded to Germany
by the lower court on the basis that forcing deportees to work in enemy territory in aid
of the war effort was an act jure imperii by the authorities of the Third Reich.
See, e.g., Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A.
114.
Res. 56/83, Annex, arts. 27, 40-41, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
115.
See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, 32 para. 64 (Feb. 3) ("The same applies to the relationship
between peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) and the
establishment of the Court's jurisdiction: the fact that a dispute relates to compliance
with a norm having such a character, which is assuredly the case with regard to the
prohibition of genocide, cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court
to entertain that dispute."); see also United States v. Tissino, Corte di Cassazione
[Cass.] [supreme court for civil and criminal matters], Feb. 25, 2009 (It.), translated in
I.L.D.C. 1262 (IT 2009); Zhang [2008] NSWSC para. 36; Jones, 129 I.L.R. at 727 para.
24 (Lord Bingham).
See Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Corte di Cassazione [Cass.]
116.
[supreme court for civil and criminal matters], Mar. 11, 2004 (It.), translated in 128
I.L.R. 659, 669 para. 9; see also Andrea Bianchi, International Decision: Ferrini v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 247 (2005).
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State to fulfil the obligation," as Article 40 defines a "serious breach"
of a peremptory norm. Quite simply, the acknowledgement of the
merely procedural bar of state immunity, precluding as it does any
consideration by the court of the merits, in no way constitutes a
ruling that the impugned conduct is lawful.117 Nor in any real sense
could it be characterized as a form of aid or assistance in the
maintenance of the situation created by the defendant state's alleged
serious breach of jus cogens. In short, arguing from first principles,
jus cogens ought to give little cause for hope to the opponents of state
immunity in "human rights" cases.
That said, reasoning based on jus cogens was championed by a
sizeable minority of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in AlAdsani;"i8 proved persuasive, it would seem, to the Court of
Cassation in Ferrini v. Germany,'" as not only affirmed but
elaborated on by the same court in subsequent cases;120 was accepted
by the Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) when upholding the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Livadia in Prefecture of
Voiotia v. Germany,121 and later by a sizeable minority of the Greek
Special Supreme Court in Margellos;122 and formed the basis of Judge
Wald's dissent in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in

117.
See, e.g., Jones, 129 I.L.R. at 727 para. 24 (Lord Bingham); id. at 732 para.
44 (Lord Hoffman); see also Enzo Cannizzaro & Beatrice I. Bonaf6, Of Rights and
Remedies: Sovereign Immunity and Fundamental Human Rights, in FROM
BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA

825, 837 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011).
118.
See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 24, 49-51 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001)
(Rozakis, Caflisch, Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto & Vajic, JJ., dissenting); id. at 52
(Bravo, J., dissenting); id. at 52 (Loucaides, J., dissenting).
119.
See Ferrini,128 I.L.R. at 668-74 paras. 8.2-12 (especially at 668-69, paras
9-91). While the judgment refers consistently to 'international crimes', rather than tojus cogens, it
characterizes the norms in question as ones 'from which no derogation is permitted' and which
'prevail over all other conventional and customary norms', and cites in this context articles 40 and
41 of the Articles on Responsibility of States, which relate to serious breaches of obligations arising
under peremptory norms of general international law. Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83 Annex, supra note 114, arts. 40, 41.
120.
See Federal Republic of Germany v. Mantelli, Corte di Cassazione [Cass.]
[supreme court for civil and criminal matters] May 29, 2008 (It.), translatedin I.L.D.C.
1037, para. 11 (IT 2008); Italy v. Milde, Corte di Cassazione [Cass.] [supreme court for
civil and criminal matters] Jan. 13, 2009 (It.), translated in I.L.D.C. 1224 (IT 2009),
paras. 3-7; see also Lozano v. Italy, Corte di Cassazione [Cass.] [supreme court for civil
and criminal matters] Jul. 24, 2008 (It.), translatedin I.L.D.C. 1085 (IT 2008), para. 6
(referring to jus cogens in the criminal context, but expressly including civil liability in
its analysis).
121.
See Prefecture of Voiotia v. Germany, Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court]
11/2000 (Greece), translatedin 129 I.L.R. 513, 521.
122.
See Margellos v. Federal Republic of Germany, Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio
[A.E.D.] [Special Supreme Court] 6/2002 (Greece), translated in 129 I.L.R. 525, 535
(Rizos, Kroustalakis, Simopoulos, Prasos, & Gyftakis, JJ., dissenting).
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Princz.123 In this light, it is not out of the question that a court might
accede to the proposition that a defendant state is not entitled to
immunity from proceedings in respect of allegations of a breach of jus
cogens. But the improbability of the latter's winning more than a
marginal band of judicial followers on its merits is pointed to by its
failure to convince the majority of the Grand Chamber in Al-Adsani,
the majority of the First Section of the ECtHR in Kalogeropoulou,
courts in the United Kingdom (Jones),124 Germany (Greek
Citizens),'12 5 Canada (Bouzari),126 New Zealand (Fang,agreeing with
dicta in Jones),127 and Australia (Zhang, agreeing with dicta in
Jones),128 or the majority of the Special Supreme Court in Greece
(Margellos)'29 .

Moving away from arguments based on first principles,13 0 it is
sometimes asserted by the opponents of the grant of state immunity
in civil actions against a foreign state in respect of alleged violations
of international law leading to death or personal injury that the
worldwide abrogation of immunity in such cases is historically
inevitable. The Whiggish contention is that, just as-in recognition of
its injustice to plaintiffs in certain circumstances-the absolute
doctrine of state immunity gave way via an incremental and
contested process to the restrictive doctrine, so too over time will an
exception be carved out for "human rights" cases. The invitation to
courts is not to resist the unstoppable, progressive tide of history. But
the argument, which is doubtless seductive, has its weaknesses, and
there is reason to suspect that it will not be uncritically embraced by
more than a few. There are key differences between the shift from the
absolute to the restrictive doctrine of state immunity and the
123.
See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1179-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (Wald, J., dissenting).
124.
See Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 I.L.R.
629, 726-27 para. 24 (Lord Bingham) (H.L. 2006) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); id.
at 732 paras. 42-45 (Lord Hoffman).
125.
See Greek Citizens v. Federal Republic of Germany (Distomo Massacre)
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 26, 2003 (Ger.), translated in
129 I.L.R. 556, 560 (2003).
126.
See Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 128 I.L.R. 586, 604-06 paras. 8495 (Can. Ont. C.A. 2004); Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 I.L.R. 427, 443-46
paras. 63-73 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J. 2002).
127.
See Fang v Jiang [2007] NZAR 420 (HC) paras. 33, 34, 51, 60, 62-63, 72
(N.Z.).
128.
See Zhang a Zemin (NSW) [2008] NSWSC 1296, para. 36 (Austl.).
129.
See Margellos v. Federal Republic of Germany, Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio
[A.E.D.] [Special Supreme Court] 6/2002 (Greece), translated in 129 I.L.R. 525, 532
para. 14 (2002).
130.
Note that the third formal argument commonly mustered in support of
attempts to deny state immunity in cases of interest to this Article, namely the purely
empirical proposition that states recognize an exception to state immunity in respect of
such cases, stands or falls (and currently falls) on a straightforward survey of the
relevant state practice and opiniojuris. It is not an argument from first principles.
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suggested evolution of an exception to state immunity in respect of
alleged violations by the defendant state of some rule of international
law conducive to the humane treatment of individuals.' 3'
For a start, the move from absolute to restrictive immunity was
motivated, and eventually rendered compelling to courts (and, where
relevant, legislatures), by pressing commercial considerations. 32 And
the sad, scandalous fact is that money will often speak much louder
than considerations of human dignity. 3 3
Secondly, the change from absolute to restrictive immunity was
possible without undermining the logic of the sovereign equality of
states, the principle underpinning the doctrine of state immunity in
both its forms. It remains the case under restrictive state immunity
that sovereignty (inhering in the defendant state) cannot be made
subject to sovereignty (inhering in the forum state, as manifest in the
coercive authority of its courts). It is simply that the touchstone of the
first sovereignty is no longer the mere identity of the defendant as a
foreign state but is also, more narrowly, the inherently sovereign
character of the acts of that state which are sought to be impugned.
The recognition of an exception to state immunity, on the other hand,
in respect of alleged violations of relevant norms of international law
cuts across the logic of the sovereign equality of states by saying that
even acts by a foreign state of an inherently sovereign character can
be denied immunity in the courts of the forum state. Such a
proposition is not, it should be made clear, unprecedented or per se
intolerable: the exception to state immunity recognized in respect of
torts committed by a foreign state in the territory of the forum state
amounts to just such a statement. 134 But the justification for the
territorial tort exception derives from the undisputed sovereign
interest of the forum state in the regulation of natural and legal
persons within its territory. The conduct in the "human rights" cases
at issue here takes place, in contrast, on the territory of the
defendant state or a third state.
Lastly, civil actions under the exceptions to state immunity
developed in accordance with the restrictive doctrine, involving as

131.
Compare Fox, STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 16, at 746-47, with note 132
and accompanying text.
132.
See, e.g., Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP'T ST.
of
Iran,
Claim
Against
the
Empire
BULL.
984
(1952);
see also
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 30, 1963
(Ger.), translated in 45 I.L.R. 57, 61 (1963); ANDREW DICKINSON ET AL., STATE
IMMUNITY: SELECTED MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 331 $ 4.002 (2004) (noting that
financial interests played a part in the passing of the State Immunity Act of 1978);
Fox, STATE IMMUNITY, supranote 16, at 217-18.
133.
Cf. Richard Garnett, The Defence of State Immunity for Acts of Torture, 18
AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 124 (1997).
134.
See supra note 38.
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they do no more than alleged breaches of contract, alleged torts,
alleged breaches of employment law, property claims, and so on,
generally call for the application of only the domestic law of the forum
state or, depending on the applicable rules of private international
law, of another state. 3 5 Claims founded on the alleged violation of
international law by the defendant state, on the other hand, even
when pleaded as garden-variety torts, require a domestic court to
stand in judgment of the international lawfulness of the actions of a
foreign state. 136 Even in jurisdictions where this is not formally
precluded by the act of state doctrine or some comparable domestic
law principle of nonjusticiability, it is often the case that national
courts are reluctant to adjudge matters of public international law
and to call into question the legality of the acts of foreign states,
especially when this has the potential to impinge on the forum state's
international relations.
In the final analysis, then, while none of this is to say that no
court, where the possibility is formally open to it, will be swayed by
perceptions of the historical inevitability of the development of an
exception to state immunity in "human rights" cases, it is improbable
that the argument will prove irresistible to a majority-and all the
more so given the abject want of state practice to suggest such a
trend.
Nor is the argument that the violation by a foreign state of some
relevant rule of international law requires the forum state to go out
on an international legal limb, and perhaps risk its friendly relations
with the defendant state, an intuitive one. Even less intuitive is the
specific contention that the refusal by the courts of the forum state to
lift state immunity in appropriate cases amounts to a violation by
that state of its own international human rights obligations. In short,
it is likely that few national courts will consider it self-evidently
incumbent on them to stick their necks out. Indeed, some of them
may not take kindly to the suggestion that the refusal to do so
amounts to a violation by the forum state of the plaintiffs human
rights.

Note, however, the exception to state immunity recognized in the Foreign
135.
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006), in respect of proceedings
in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in
the United States.
Id.
136.

Cf.Garnett, supra note 133, at 124.
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It is true that a powerfully emotive countervailing policy
consideration in the sort of cases at issue here is the likely inability of
the plaintiff to obtain satisfactory redress in the courts of the
defendant state or even at the international level. Judges are not
heartless, and they take no pleasure in dismissing cases which are
compelling from the point of view of basic humanity. But most tend
also to be conscious of the fact that a judicial forum is no guarantor of
a happy ending and that, as tragic as it may be, many morally
deserving cases are lost.
(e)

JurisdictionalImmunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece

Intervening)
The final nail in the coffin of attempts to circumvent state
immunity in domestic civil proceedings for death or personal injury
alleged to be caused by the defendant state in breach of some norm,
perhaps peremptory, of international law relative to the humane
treatment of individuals may well prove to be the case of
JurisdictionalImmunities of the State, brought by Germany against

Italy in the ICJ and currently in progress. The proceedings relate to
several rulings in the Italian courts, starting with Ferrini, to the
effect that Germany may not rely on state immunity as a bar to
actions for damages in respect of undisputed German violations of
international humanitarian law during the Second World War.
Germany's argument is that, through these rulings, Italy incurs
international responsibility for the unlawful denial to Germany of
3 7 The case is
state immunity in respect of acts jure imperii.1
complicated by the fact that most of the acts impugned in the
relevant national proceedings were committed, on the one hand, on
Italian territory but, on the other, by the German armed forces in,
what is more, the course of armed conflict. The case is nonetheless
likely to oblige the ICJ to confront the international lawfulness of the
denial of state immunity by the forum state to the defendant state in
cases implicating breaches by the latter, whether alleged or
uncontested, of international humanitarian law and the like.
Even leaving aside speculative influences such as the national
backgrounds of most of the judges in states unlikely to favor "human
rights" cases in foreign courts, it is extremely hard to picture a
majority of the Court backing-in the absence of consistent and
representative state practice and opinto juris (not to mention logically
cogent arguments) in support of the proposition, and given the
potential of such a decision to lead to antagonism between states-a

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Application Instituting
137.
Proceedings, at 4, 17-18 paras. 13-14 (Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/143/ 14923.pdf.
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customary international rule to the effect that state immunity is
unavailable as a bar to domestic civil proceedings alleging the
violation by the defendant foreign state of rules, even those of a
peremptory character, of international law. And were the ICJ, as is
not unlikely, to come down categorically against such a rule, even if
only in terms of customary international law "as it presently stands"
and subject to an impassioned dissent by Judge Cangado Trindade,
the chances that future national courts (or legislatures) would reopen
the matter are close to zero.
Indeed, it may be that the proceedings initiated by Germany and
foreshadowed for some time beforehand are already have a chilling
effect on judicial adventurism in this regard, at least in the Italian
courts. In its preliminary order on jurisdiction of February 25, 2009
in United States v. Tissino, the Court of Cassation-although easily

distinguishing Ferrini (which it affirmed) on the facts, with the
consequence that no in-depth discussion of the case was
necessary'l-went to surprising and almost masochistic lengths to
detail the national and ECtHR case law contrary to its own
jurisprudence and to highlight, by reference to "more than one
decision," including "among others" Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application:

2002), how the ICJ had excluded the possibility "that a violation of
jus cogens might be sufficient to grant jurisdiction over a State."' 39
2.

Obstacles to the Legislative Abrogation of Immunity from
Proceedings

The considerations outlined above (with the exception of the
current statutory embodiment of state immunity in many
jurisdictions) are likely also to militate against the unilateral passage
of national legislation to deny state immunity in the type of case at
issue here. Indeed, it is distinctly arguable that national
governments, with their more direct interest in the conduct of the
state's international relations, are even less likely than national
courts to blaze a trail on this front. It is no secret, for example, that
the Italian government is nonplussed by the Court of Cassation's
decisions in Ferrini and subsequent cases. 140 Additionally, just as

138.
See United States v. Tissino, Cass., sez. un., 25 febbraio 2009, n. 4461 (It.),
translatedin I.L.D.C. 1262, para. 20 (2009).
See id. paras. 17-19 (quote at para. 19 (author's translation)).
139.
See for example the view expressed by the Italian government in the joint
140.
declaration issued in Trieste on November 18, 2008 at the conclusion of GermanItalian governmental consultations on the matter quoted in Jurisdictional Immunities
of the State (Ger. v. It.), Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 137, at 4 n.2.
(noting in relevant part: "Italy respects Germany's decision to have recourse to the
International Court of Justice for a pronouncement on the principle of State immunity.
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formerly with the unilateral statutory denial of state and other
internationally mandated immunities in Belgian criminal cases
involving international crimes, other governments will certainly take
note of where the unilateral denial of state immunity in civil cases of
the present sort ends up, namely under the diplomatic hammer and
in the ICJ. In short, we are unlikely to see Belgium's civil counterpart
any time soon. 141 This being so, there is little point in pressing
governments to legislate to abrogate state immunity in "human
rights" cases.
The most sensible and desirable way for governments to proceed
in the event that they were minded to abrogate state immunity in
civil claims in respect of death or personal injury allegedly occasioned
by the defendant state's violation of relevant international law would
to be to conclude a multilateral international agreement on the
matter, maybe in the form of an optional protocol to the UN
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property.142 But the idea is a pie in the sky. The perhaps unpalatable
truth is that the great majority of states were content with the status
quo before the rise of "human rights" claims in national courts
against foreign states. The grant of state immunity in cases of this
sort before their own courts avoids unwanted diplomatic discomfort,
while the recognition of the same in foreign courts stands surety for
their interests as potential defendants. (It is little wonder, for
example, that Germany is suing Italy in the ICJ, given the estimated
250 civil actions in respect of the Second World War pending against
it in twenty-four regional Tribunali and two appellate courts in Italy
at the date of institution of proceedings.) 143 This being so, even if any
government were to prove responsive to encouragement to conclude a

... [I]t considers that a pronouncement by the International Court on State immunity
will be useful in clarifying a complex question." (author's translation)).
It is true that the United States, which was so opposed to Belgium's
141.
abrogation of state immunity in the context of international crimes, passed statutes
that dispensed in a limited range of civil claims with the immunity from proceedings
otherwise owed to those foreign states designated as state sponsors of terrorism. See 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008)). But U.S.
international legal exceptionalism is precisely that.
142.
See, e.g., Hall, supranote 6; McGregor, supranote 6, at 445.
143.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Application Instituting
Proceedings, supra note 137, at 16 para. 12. The paragraph continues:
It stands to reason that Germany is thus involved in a continual confrontation
which requires a huge amount of financial and intellectual expenditure. A
special task force of lawyers had to be set up to follow the developments with
their manifold ramifications. Having to observe the judicial practice of the
Italian judges in the relevant cases, and to respond to it in an appropriate
manner, has grown into a serious stumbling block adversely affecting the
bilateral relationships between the two nations.
Id.
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multilateral agreement to the effect contemplated here, and even
were it to find other, like-minded governments with which to conclude
it, the resulting agreement would be next-to-useless and, indeed, a
potential source of diplomatic ruction, given both the extreme
unlikelihood of the participation in it of states most likely to be
defendants to the sorts of foreign proceedings in question and the
pacta tertiis rule of the law of treaties. 144
3.

Obstacles to Redress Even Absent Immunity from Proceedings

Last but not least, it must always be borne in mind that the
availability to the defendant state of immunity from proceedings is
only the first hurdle faced by a plaintiff in a civil action in respect of
death or personal injury allegedly resulting from a foreign state's
breach of international law. Even in the event that the defendant
state's immunity from proceedings is sidestepped, there remains a
host of challenges, at least some of which threaten to render the
circumvention a hollow victory.
To begin with, and even leaving aside problems of proof and
questions of domestic and international law going to the merits, there
exist further obstacles to securing a favorable judgment. In most, if
not all jurisdictions, there will be issues of private international law,
such as the court's underlying jurisdiction over extraterritorial
conduct, the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the possible
application of the lex loci delicti commissi. In addition, in jurisdictions
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
others, the act of state doctrine and cognate principles of nonjusticiability may prevent the court from adjudicating on the
impugned acts of the foreign state, although relevant exceptions may
apply in certain places and cases.

144.
Note, in this connection, that the formulation of the pacta tertiis rule
articulated in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is an
inadequate reflection of customary international law. It is not just that a treaty may
not create obligations or rights for third states without their consent. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered
into force Jan. 30, 1980). It is also the case that a treaty cannot infringe the legal rights
of third states. See, e.g., Island of Palmas (Neth.[U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 842 (1928); para.
(2) of the commentary to draft art. 30 of the ILC's Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties,
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 18th Sess., May 4-July 19, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1
(1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 226, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966
("nor modify in any way their legal rights without their consent"); ARNOLD DUNCAN
McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 321 (1961). What this means is that a state party to
any treaty provision which provides for an exception to state immunity in a manner not
in accordance with customary international law may not, consistently with
international law, apply that exception to a state not party to the treaty.
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Secondly, even where the plaintiff obtains a favorable judgment,
there remains the very real difficulty of enforcing it, whether in the
forum state or another state.
In terms of enforcement against assets of the defendant state
within the forum state, there is the pitfall posed by the fact that,
under the restrictive doctrine of state immunity, immunity from
proceedings and immunity from post-judgment measures of
constraint (viz execution and attachment in aid of execution) do not
march side by side. 145 Rather, as a general rule, any property of a
foreign state within the forum state's territory which is not used for
commercial purposes will be immune from such post-judgment
measures, regardless of whether the judgment was obtained in
proceedings from which the defendant state was not entitled to
immunity. 146 The chequered history of attempts in the United States.
to enforce judgments obtained against designated state sponsors of
terrorism-which by virtue of legislation do not enjoy immunity from
proceedings in U.S. courts as regards claims for damages in respect of
death or personal injury caused to certain classes of plaintiffs by
certain actsl 4 7-speaks to the challenges that this limitation on
enforcement throws up. 148 Attempts to enforce judgments obtained in
the Italian courts in relation to German violations of international
humanitarian law during the Second World War provide a similar
object lesson. Germany, in addition to its grievances over the denial of
immunity from proceedings, is currently suing Italy in the ICJ for the
imposition by the Italian judicial authorities of post-judgment
measures of constraint on a German-Italian cultural center in

145.
See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 342-43; Fox, STATE IMMUNITY,
supranote 16, at 8, 34-35, 599-662; Stoll, supra note 16, paras 49-76.
146.
Note that the situation is different in certain jurisdictions when it comes to
enforcement against the property of what are known as separate entities or agencies
and instrumentalities of a state. But this is unlikely, by and large, to be of great use to
judgment creditors on the facts of the sorts of cases under discussion here.
147.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1605A, 1610(a)(7) (2006).
148.
Although, by way of 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7), Congress has provided an
exception in relation to judgments obtained pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006)) to the immunity from post-judgment measures of
constraint from which property in the United States belonging to designated state
sponsors of terrorism would otherwise benefit, regardless of whether the property is or
was involved in the act on which the claim is based, this exception applies only if, in
accordance with the chapeau to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2006), the property is used for
commercial activity in the United States. See ELSEA, supra note 89 (summarizing a
complicated history of attempts to enforce judgments obtained by virtue of the "state
sponsor of terrorism" exception to state immunity). Note that 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)
(2006) exempts from 28 U.S.C. § 1610's exceptions to immunity from post-judgment
measures of constraint any property of a foreign central bank or monetary authority
held for its own account (except where this immunity has been waived) and certain
military-related property.
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Italy.149 Against this backdrop, one might add, it seems unlikely in
the extreme that the government of any state would pass legislation
to abrogate immunity from post-judgment measures of constraint in
"human rights" cases.
When it comes to assets of the defendant state held in the
territory of the defendant state or a third state, there is the problem
of the necessary reliance for the enforcement of any favorable
judgment on the courts of that other state. Those courts may simply
refuse to give effect to a foreign judgment obtained in what they view
to be violation of the applicable international rules on state
immunity. The German Bundesgerichtshof did precisely this in Greek
Citizens in relation to the judgment of the Livadia court in the
Distomo Massacre case.150

B. Misdirected in Terms of Fairness
The current strategic focus on state immunity on the part of
advocates for redress for those killed or physically injured through
international wrongs by states is misdirected as a matter of basic
fairness.
At present, victim's advocates place the onus to afford a remedy
for an alleged international wrong on the courts of a state which
played no part in that wrong and, indeed, which risks an
international wrong by denying immunity from proceedings to the
defendant state. In cases framed around the international human
right of access to a court, the legal contention is even that it would be
internationally wrongful for the forum state to accord such immunity.
In the activist and occasionally the academic discourse, the idea that
the courts of the forum state should act in a manner which, according
to the orthodox positivist view, is actually required of that state by

149.
See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Application
Instituting Proceedings, supra note 137, at 1 para. 11. As for the Greek proceedings in
the Distomo Massacre case, it will be recalled that the Greek Minister of Justice
refused to enforce the first-instance judgment of the Livadia court even when this was
upheld by the Greek Supreme Court, believing it to have been obtained in violation of
the international rules on immunity from proceedings. His refusal was eventually
upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in Kalogeropoulou as consonant with
Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. ECHR, supra note
12, art. 6(1); Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, 129 I.L.R. 537 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002). On a
different but related note, for the argument in the ECHR context that treating
immunity from proceedings as contrary to Article 6(1) would necessitate treating
immunity from enforcement the same way (thereby surmounting the problem of
enforcement highlighted above), see Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 24, 46-48
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001) (Pellonpaa & Bratza, JJ., concurring) (warning on this account
against ruling that immunity from proceedings was incompatible with Article 6(1)).
150.
See Greek Citizens v. Federal Republic of Germany (Distomo Massacre),
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 26, 2003 (Ger.), translated in
129 I.L.R. 556.
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international law, viz to grant immunity from proceedings, is treated
as faintly scandalous. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the less

frequent calls on governments to legislate to abrogate state immunity
in "human rights" cases.
But this legal strategy and discourse have their bad guys, so to
speak, confused. The chief villain of the piece in such cases-in the
event, that is, that the victim's allegations are well founded-is the
state which kills or physically injures the victim in the first place
through its violation of international human rights law or
international humanitarian law or the like and which then denies the
victim or next-of-kin redress, whether by way of ex gratia
compensation or judicial remedy.15 1 To the extent that the
government of the victim's state of nationality, which in many but not
all cases will be the forum state, has refused without good cause to
make genuine and sufficient diplomatic representations on behalf of
the victim with a view to securing redress from the responsible state,
that government is also worthy of condemnation. It is towards these
parties alone and only for these reasons that any legal strategy for
redress in "human rights" cases and any moral opprobrium ought to
be directed. It is unfair to lay the blame at the feet of the forum
state's courts, and it is unfair to blame that state's government for
not statutorily abrogating the defendant state's immunity from
domestic civil proceedings in respect of such cases. As either course of
action seriously risks breaching international law, neither can
seriously be considered within the forum state's discretion. Even
more skewed is the suggestion that the grant of state immunity by
the forum state could constitute a breach by that state of
international human rights law.
Being topsy-turvy in terms of fairness, such arguments lack the
attractive rhetorical quality of intuitiveness. Indeed, the idea that the
forum state should be blamed for a violation of human rights is
positively counterintuitive. In turn, the arguments' lack of intuitive
quality makes it more difficult to mobilize a broad-based consensus
around them. From the point of view of wider civil society, including
bar associations and the like, it is hard to get angry about a court or
government's reluctance to risk violating its international legal
obligations. From the point of view of those courts and governments,
the moral, political, and attempted legal coercion to do so breeds
antagonism towards campaigners for redress for victims.
Conversely, few would deny that it is morally incumbent on a
state which is plausibly alleged to have killed or injured an individual

It should be stressed that the atypical case of the responsibility of the
151.
Federal Republic of Germany for the atrocities of the Third Reich, the subject over the
years of international agreements and state-to-state payments, is a much more
complicated matter from the point of view of fairness.

20111

HEADSAND WALLS, HEARTSAND MINDS

1039

in breach of international law to submit the matter in good faith, in
the event that it disputes the allegations, to some form of
adjudication. Nor would there be much sympathy these days for the
suggestion that a state whose nationals plausibly allege death or
personal injury at the hands of another state in violation of some
international rule on the humane treatment of individuals is morally
at total liberty to refuse, for no persuasive reason, to make, in the
first instance, bona fide diplomatic representations on behalf of those
nationals to that other state with a view to securing adequate redress
for the former and, failing a satisfactory response to these
representations, perhaps even formally to espouse their nationals'
claim at international law. In both instances, the matter is one over
which the relevant state has complete discretion as a matter of public
international law. That is, neither course of action could possibly be
considered internationally wrongful. The only stumbling block is the
necessary domestic political will. And it is on the lack of the
necessary political will in relevant cases that any campaign for
redress for the victims of violations of international law by foreign
states should focus. In other words, it is on the aforementioned links
in the chain of governmental decision making which comprise the
factual background to any "human rights" case-namely the refusal
of the allegedly responsible state to afford victims or their next-of-kin
the possibility of a remedy and the refusal of the victim's state of
nationality to take up their case with the allegedly responsible state,
initially diplomatically and maybe ultimately by bringing an
international claim on their behalf-that moral and political
condemnation and, where possible, legal pressure should and might
more persuasively, because more intuitively and sensibly, be brought
to bear.
C. Misdirected in Terms of Ultimate Policy Objectives
Even were they to succeed in the fullest sense in individual
cases, civil actions against foreign states in respect of internationally
unlawful ill-treatment could only be a band-aid solution to the
problem of civil impunity for violations of international rules on the
humane treatment of individuals. Redress obtained through the
courts of a state not party to the violation does nothing to foster the
rule of law in the responsible state, contempt for which is what by
and large leads in the first place to the violation in question and to
the denial of local remedies for death or personal injury occasioned by
it. Nor does the securing of such redress challenge what is often the
culpable pusillanimity of the government of the victim's state of
nationality, which, for commercial or other strategic reasons, may be
unwilling to "offend" the putatively responsible state by pursuing
with it credible allegations of torture, extrajudicial killing, arbitrary
detention, or the like. Indeed, the judicial award of compensation in
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the courts of states not involved in such violations, even where those
states may be the states of nationality of the victims, lets the culprits
off the hook, making it in practice unnecessary for the responsible
state (especially when the relevant judgments are unenforceable) to
reform its administration of justice to comply with international
standards, and relieving the pressure on the government of the state
of nationality to stand up for its citizens and for the global rule of
international law. To this extent, the sorts of cases under discussion
here can be criticized as defeatist and unwittingly compliant in the
unacceptable status quo, forsaking what should be the ultimate policy
objectives of those working towards the universal embrace of humane
values for what is, at best, short-term gain.
Of course, this is all very easy to say when one has never been
tortured. Individual victims and their advisors can hardly be
criticized for taking what they can get. But the point here is that, on
the whole, they cannot get even this. The promise of short-term gain
through the denial of state immunity in "human rights" cases
remains largely unfulfilled, and promises to remain so. In this light,
the strategy of targeting state immunity in such cases looks even
more unwise.
IV. SHIFTING THE STRATEGIC Focus
Given the likely futility of "human rights" claims of the above
sort, as well as their skewed sense of where the blame rightly lies and
their counterproductivity in the grand scheme of things, it is
submitted that efforts to secure redress for the victims of illtreatment abroad in breach of international law should be directed
away from attacking the grant of state immunity by forum states'
courts towards targeting both the failure of allegedly responsible
states to afford victims the opportunity for a remedy and the failure
of victims' states of nationality to do enough to defend their nationals'
interests.15 2
Turning first to action directed towards the state of nationality of
the victim, which of the two possible target states is probably the
more likely to yield results, pressure should be exerted on that state's
government initially to provide conscientious consular assistance,
where requested, to the victim's efforts to secure such effective local
remedies as may be available, especially by helping to navigate the

As stated supra, much of what is suggested here chimes with campaigns
152.
already undertaken by some interested pressure groups. For example, regarding the
conduct and policies of the United Kingdom in the areas of consular and diplomatic
protection, see REDRESS, IMMUNITY V. ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 7 and REDRESS,
PROTECTION OF BRITISH NATIONALS, supra note 7.
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rocky shoals of civil litigation in the foreign state. Next, as may prove
necessary in the not unlikely event that effective local remedies prove
unavailable, the government of the victim's state of nationality
should be put under concerted pressure to make bona fide and
strenuous diplomatic efforts to encourage the state against which
prima facie reasonable allegations of internationally unlawful illtreatment are made to engage seriously with the need to concede
responsibility and provide reparation, whether ex gratia or through
its domestic courts, or, if it contests the allegations, to submit them to
some form of adjudication, be it in its own courts or in an appropriate
international forum. Failing a satisfactory response on the part of the
allegedly responsible state, the victim's national government should
be pressured to present the former with an international legal claim
in diplomatic protection. Such pressure might be case-specific, but it
might also take the form of a prominent public campaign to highlight
the scandal of a government's frequent refusal (perhaps constructive)
to make sincere and thorough diplomatic representations on behalf of
nationals injured in specific states. 5 3 It is, of course, axiomatic that
public international law recognizes no obligation on the part of a state
to espouse its nationals' claims on the international plane,154 with the
result that one potential rhetorical angle is denied to victims and
their supporters. At the same time, for what it is worth (which in
formal terms is admittedly little), Article 19(a) and (b) respectively of
the ILC's Articles on Diplomatic Protection provide that a state
entitled to do so should "[glive due consideration to the possibility of
exercising diplomatic protection, especially when a significant injury
has occurred," and should "[t]ake into account, wherever feasible, the
views of injured persons with regard to resort to diplomatic protection
and the reparation to be sought."' 5 5 Linked to such a campaign, even
if not necessarily in the courts of all states, might be formal legal
action at the domestic level with a, view to challenging the
government's inaction on behalf of nationals allegedly injured at the
hands of a foreign state. In the English courts, a relevant chink in the
armor of the separation of powers was prised open in the case of
Abbasi, where the Court of Appeal-while maintaining, in line with
international and established domestic law, that the UK government
was not obliged as a matter of domestic law to intervene

153.
A paradigm case is the extreme reluctance of successive UK governments
adequately to represent the interests of injured UK nationals vis-&-vis Saudi Arabia.
154.
See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 44 para. 78 (Feb. 5); see also para. (2) of the ILC's commentary to
what became art. 2 of its Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Rep. of the Int'l Law
Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006).
155.
Diplomatic Protection, G.A. Res. 62/67, Annex, art. 19(a)-(b), U.N. Doc
A/RES/62/67 (Dec. 6, 2007).
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diplomatically, let alone by way of a formal claim in diplomatic
protection, on behalf of a national alleging injury abroad at the hands
of another state-held that the government was at least obliged to
consider making representations. 15 6 The same has since been held to
be the case in South Africa by the Constitutional Court.15 7
Perhaps more promising as regards certain states of nationality
might be a public campaign focusing on the chariness of the
government's formal policy for espousing the claims of its nationals at
the international level. It may be that a government can be shamed
into amending its policy to circumscribe its discretion, at least to a
reasonable degree, in "human rights" cases. Where no policy of this
sort exists, a government may at the very least prove amenable to
arguments that some such document would be desirable in the
interests of transparency. The drafting of a formal policy would in
turn represent an opportune moment for public and private lobbying
with a view to improving prospects for diplomatic intervention in
support of nationals killed or physically injured by foreign states in
violation of international law.
As for action directed towards what would otherwise be the
defendant states to "human rights" claims in other states, there are
two planks to any sensible campaign for redress in cases of death or
personal injury in breach of international law. Both, however, go
towards the same uncomplicated moral and political argument,
namely that it is incumbent upon any state which contests plausible
allegations against it of internationally unlawful ill-treatment to
respond in good faith to the allegations. And despite begging the
question to an extent, 158 the principle that every state is obliged to
afford individuals a remedy for any violation by it of their
internationally guaranteed human rights' 59 (an obligation reiterated
in the specific context of torture in Article 14 of the UN Convention
Against Torture) 160 and the more general ,international legal axiom
that every international wrong entails the obligation to make

See Abassi v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 126 I.L.R.
156.
685, 718-25 paras. 80-106 (EWCA (Civ) 2002) (U.K.). The unstated upshot is that any
decision not to make such representations would itself be liable to judicial review on
the usual grounds of rationality and legitimate expectation.
157.
See Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 136 I.L.R. 452,
473-77 paras. 67-81 (CC S. Mr. 2004).
158.
By this is meant that both are predicated on the assumption that the
defendant state has committed an international wrong, whereas the whole point of any
adjudication to which it is hoped the defendant state will submit is to establish
whether the latter has committed an international wrong.
159.
See ACHR, supra note 13, art. 25; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 9, art. 2(3); ECHR, supra note 12, art. 13.
160.
See UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 31, art 14.
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reparation for injury caused thereby 6 1 are appealingly
uncomplicated rhetorical vehicles for the deployment of suasion and
even outrage in this connection.
First, before or after any invocation of state immunity to fend off
a "human rights" case in a foreign court, pressure should obviously be
brought to bear on the putatively responsible state either to afford
some domestic forum or to submit to some international means of
binding dispute settlement for the adjudication of the legal and
factual allegations against it, waiving, in the latter case, the
procedural precondition of exhaustion of local remedies.162 The
provision of alternative means of possible redress-alternative, that
is, to "human rights" litigation in a foreign court-might usefully be
explicitly and relentlessly portrayed, both to the state in question and
more widely, as the quid pro quo for the availability of immunity from
foreign judicial proceedings and measures of constraint in such cases.
In this regard, an eye-catching standard under which to mobilize
support might be the words of the ICJ in Certain Matters of Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, where the Court declared
unambiguously that "the State notifying a foreign court that judicial
process should not proceed, for reasons of immunity, against its State
organs, is assuming responsibility for any internationally wrongful
act in issue committed by such organs."163 Broadening the focus from
specific cases to the more general unavailability in a given state of
judicial or even quasi-judicial remedies for injury caused in breach of
international law by that state's public authorities, the same
argument might be invoked to crystallize a consensus around a
campaign for the repeal or amendment of any domestic laws that
operate, either procedurally or substantively, to shield from private
litigation the government or servants of that government. Examples
include laws providing for civil amnesty for domestic public
authorities, for unreasonably short limitation periods for the
initiation of civil actions against such authorities or for the immunity
of such authorities from suit tout court, as well as legal doctrines in
accordance with which domestic public authorities are formally
incapable of the commission of civil wrongs in the first place. Equally,
the above argument could be relied on to muster support for the
state's acceptance of the right of individual communication (or, as the
terminological case may be, petition or complaint) to any relevant
international human rights organ-in the event, that is, that the

161.
See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83, Annex, supra note 114, art. 31 (as consonant with customary international law).
162.
See Diplomatic Protection, G.A. Res. 62/67, Annex, supra note 155, art.
15(e). (same).
163.
Certain Matters of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. Fr.),
2008 I.C.J. 177, 244 para. 196 (June 4).
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state is even party to the international human rights instrument(s) in
question. As specifically regards local judicial remedies and
international arbitration, it might also pay to emphasize to potential
defendant states that the provision of avenues for these can bar at
least some "human rights" litigation in the U.S. courts. 164
In the event, faute de mieux, of the bringing of a "human rights"
claim in the courts of another state, the moral and political argument
ought to be aimed at shaming the defendant state-to the extent that
it has not otherwise afforded the victim or victims a reasonable
opportunity for redress-into waiving the state immunity, both from
proceedings and execution, to which it would otherwise be entitled in
respect of inherently sovereign acts. 165 While, needless to say, any
such state would be perfectly entitled as a matter of both
international and domestic law to insist on its immunity, the scandal
of its doing so, insofar as it may not have otherwise provided. an
adequate forum for redress, is worth publicly playing up. One tactic
for turning up the heat on such states might be by rhetorical analogy
with a provision common to many conventions on the privileges and
immunities of international organizations, including the privileges
and immunities of the representatives of member states to those
organizations, the archetype of which is Article IV, Section 14 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, 166 which reads as follows:
Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of
Members not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but
in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the United Nations. Consequently a Member not only
has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its
representative in any case where in the opinion of the Member the
immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived
without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded.

Where a defendant state to a "human rights" claim in the courts of
another state has denied reasonable opportunity for redress to those
alleging death or personal injury as a result of its violation of
international law, it is certainly arguable, and attractively so, that
the defendant state's insistence on state immunity as a bar to the
proceedings "would impede the course of justice," making it at least

As regards local remedies and civil actions under the Aliens Tort Claims
164.
Act, see for example, the majority view in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc). See also Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, §2(b), 28 U.S.C. §
1350 note (2006). As for international arbitration, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(2006).
See UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 16, arts. 7,
165.
19(a)--(b).
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. IV
166.
§ 14, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
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morally incumbent on that state to submit to the jurisdiction of a
foreign court to resolve the matter legally.

V. CONCLUSION

Proponents of the denial of state immunity to states sued in the
courts of other states for death or personal injury allegedly caused by
them in breach of international law are, by and large, metaphorically
banging their heads against a brick wall. It may well be that, with
hard enough heads and sufficient banging, the wall will come
tumbling down. But this is unlikely. More probable is that the
banging will lead only to pain and frustration. Nor is the current
attack on the grant of state immunity in such cases ever likely to win
sufficient hearts and minds, be it the hearts and minds of a wide
enough swathe of civil society or even of the judiciary in the relevant
forum states or, far more significantly in the long run, the hearts and
minds of the governments of the victims' states of nationality or
indeed of the states against which allegations of internationally
wrongful ill-treatment are credibly levelled. The present approach
blames the wrong guy, as it were, and gives the right guys too easy a
ride. While no one can blame victims for seeking redress any which
way they can, ultimately any answer to the problem of foreign states'
civil impunity for internationally unlawful death and personal injury,
if answer there be, is more likely and more justly to come through a
change in strategy.

